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Abstract 
In this thesis we will describe a football player’s value to a football club. First we will explore 
how a player can generate revenue. In doing so, we will describe two valuation factors, where 
a football player can fulfil none, one or both of them. The two factors will describe how a 
football player can generate revenue for his club. Next we will present a valuation model 
based on theory from option pricing. The valuation model will be linked up to the two factors, 
and give us the financial value of a football player. A player’s financial value can differ 
among clubs. So, in the case of a potential transfer the clubs involved must negotiate a 
transfer fee, while the buying clubs must negotiate a salary with the player. We will present a 
bargaining framework to discuss which parties have bargaining power. With this framework 
we can also discuss outcomes of transfer fee and salary. 
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 1. Introduction 
On June 11, 2009, several newspapers could report a new world record transfer deal: English 
side Manchester United had accepted a mind-blowing €94m offer – dwarfing the old world 
record of €76m from 2001 – for their Portuguese star, Cristiano Ronaldo, from Real Madrid 
from Spain (Goal, 2009a). Critics – such as the UEFA (the European football association) 
president, Michel Platini, and FC Barcelona vice president, Jaume Ferrer, – claimed the 
transfer fee was damaging to football and that no player is worth that much (Goal, 2009b; 
Goal, 2009c). Less than one year after, however, some sources reported that Ronaldo was 
going to be the most profitable player in the history of Real Madrid (Mercopress, 2009). The 
sales from 1.2 million replica shirts and other merchandise in Madrid alone had already 
covered the €94m transfer fee; and in the coming years it is expected that he will generate up 
to €200m for the club in advertising and other publicity revenue (PRLog, 2010). And then we 
are not considering his contribution to revenue through sporting performance, i.e. prize money 
for performing well in competitions, which is also very high. The result is: subtract his yearly 
wage of more than €10m (Ogden, 2009) and you will still get a positive cash flow. 
Leeds United from England, on the other hand, experienced the quite opposite (Cathcart, 
2004). When facing the possibility of great sporting success – which in turn resulted in big 
revenues – they invested heavily in new players; a strategy working well in the 1999/2000 and 
2000/2001 seasons. They were able to raise some of the money through relatively short-term 
financing, and paid off the debt with prize money from competitions. In the 2001/2002 
season, however, the team failed to deliver high enough performance. Consequently, they did 
not get the needed revenues to service the debt or their huge wage bill and they had to sell off 
players. This sent the club into a downwards spiral which ultimately forced the club into 
administration and relegation six years later, in 2007 (Harris, 2007). Effectively, this meant 
that one of the top clubs in Europe in 2001 played at the third English level in 2007; a 
dramatic downfall that can be traced back to unsuccessful player investments and too 
expensive financing. Today, more than ten years later, they are still trying to recover: 
currently (2010/2011 season) they are playing in the second highest level in England. 
What happened in these two cases? Did Real Madrid make a killing? Why did Leeds United’s 
strategy go so horribly wrong? This thesis aims to answer those questions. 
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 1.1 Research topics 
What value can a football player add to a football club; and, how much will the club have to 
pay for that player? 
2. Motivating example 
When you write about untraditional subjects, like applying financial models and investment 
theory to football, one of the challenges is to make the topic accessible for everyone in your 
target audience. In taking that task seriously, this introduction will hopefully prove 
informative and also motivate our research topics. 
2.1 The simple case 
Imagine a football club, doesn’t matter where, that consistently achieves a league position of, 
say, 7th place. There are 20 teams in this particular league, the top 5 qualify for the European 
cup and the bottom three relegate to the lower, less glorious division. The clubs receive a 
bonus from the national football association depending on the position they achieve in the 
league. On matches the club fills up 75% of the 30.000 seats of the stadium, on average. The 
media coverage contract is negotiated by the national football association and the clubs in the 
league share the proceeds equally. The club’s other sources of revenue are a sponsor deal and 
sale of supporter equipment. 
Now, the owner of the club wants to improve the performance of the team so they can qualify 
for the European cup in which all the best teams in Europe compete. This European cup will 
dramatically increase the revenue of the club. But to qualify, as already explained, they must 
achieve a league position of top 5. The manager and the staff of the club have successfully 
identified a player who, if they buy him, will make the team achieve a position in the top 5 
and hence be eligible for the profitable European cup. 
For a finance scholar two interesting questions arise: What value can this player add to the 
club? And, how much will the club have to pay for him? 
To make a valuation of the player we need to quantify the impact on team performance and 
other possible effects such as increased attendance and sales, in cash flow terms. In this 
stylized example we assume no uncertainty, no taxes, full information, the club has ample 
financial slack to buy the player; the transfer market is imperfect, i.e., there exists positive 
NPV transfers. Further, investing in the player will not increase the costs of the club and the 
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 club will not have to do additional investments compared to a situation of not signing the 
player. To simplify even further, the duration of the effect of the player is one year, or one 
season in football terms, so we are talking about a onetime gain. We will, of course, relax all 
of these assumptions later. 
 
Table 1 Effects of new player 
Table 1 shows an attempt in quantifying the effects described above. As we can see, the 
increased revenue is €13.500.000. But is this the price they are willing to pay for the player, 
ignoring discounting? No. We need to account for a factor we have not mentioned yet: the 
player’s salary. By including player salary we will be able to define the value added or present 
value of the player: 
  = 	
 
 −   
 
  
This is then the price they are willing to pay, but is it also the price they have to pay? Not 
necessarily. We have to look at how important, in PV-terms, the player is to the selling club. 
By applying the same assumptions as before and treating the loss of the player as a onetime 
loss we get the following expression: 
  =  
 −   
 
  
As we will see, the buying club has to compensate for the selling club’s “Value lost” with a 
transfer fee. Therefore, it is immediate that a transfer can only be possible if the value gained 
by the buying club is greater than, or equal to, the value lost by the selling club, in absolute 
terms: 
Without With Incr. revenue
League position 7 5
Bonus 13 000 000 15 000 000 2 000 000        
Media revenue 20 000 000 20 000 000 -                    
Stadium tickets 5 000 000   5 000 000   -                    
European cup No Yes
Bonus 0 10 000 000 10 000 000      
Stadium tickets 0 1 000 000   1 000 000        
Other
Sponsor deal 3 000 000   3 000 000   -                    
Sales 2 000 000   2 500 000   500 000           
13 500 000      
3
   ≥   
This is an obvious but, nevertheless, important result that is valid regardless of our 
assumptions. We will refer to this result as the transfer condition. By examining the two 
expressions, we see that increasing the salary (ceteris paribus) will decrease the value added 
for the buying club. For the selling club, increasing salary (ceteris paribus) will decrease the 
value lost. Note that the player’s salary does not have to be equal in the two clubs. Actually, 
the only unknown variable is the player salary in the new club so we are able to express the 
transfer condition as an inequality with one unknown: 
	 −  ≥  −   
=> 
  ≤ 	 −  +  
Increased revenue (IR), decreased revenue (DR) and player salary in selling club (SSC) are 
known variables whereas player salary in buying club (SBC) is yet to be decided. To exclude 
an unrealistic (negative) outcome of SBC we require that all variables be greater than or equal 
to zero. The rationale behind non-negative salary is obvious. Non-negative increased revenue 
is also straight forward. We defend non-negative decreased revenue, the equivalent of saying 
that the player is actually hurting the club’s revenues, by saying that this player would be 
removed if this happens. Note, however, that value lost can be negative. This happens if 
DR<SSC. That is, the player is hurting the club’s financial value and the club will be better off 
by selling or firing the player if that is possible. 
Let us now introduce the transfer fee (T) or investment cost so we can define the NPV of the 
buying club (BC) and selling club (SC): 
!" = 	 −  − # ≥ 0 
!" = # −  +  ≥ 0 
Player salary in buying club (SBC) and the transfer fee (T) need to be decided somehow – we 
will come back to that. The other variables are known. Observe that for particular values of 
IR, DR and SSC there are combinations, or negotiation outcomes, of T and SBC that can make 
both clubs as well as the player (at least in salary-terms) better off. The transfer is therefore 
desirable from a Pareto optimal perspective: both clubs will have NPV greater than zero and 
the player will get a higher salary. 
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 By reorganizing the terms we can find boundaries for the unknown variables:
Transfer fee has to be less than or equal to the increased revenue less player sa
The transfer fee has to compensate for the loss in revenue less saved salary expense. 
Combining these two boundaries we get:
which we will call the NPV condition. It is easy to s
of the transfer condition; we just incorporate the transfer fee, T. Later, we will show that the 
NPV condition creates multiple bargaining situations between player and 
between buying and selling club.
Below we illustrate the transfer condition and the NPV condition. Both need to be satisfied 
before a transfer can take place. Note that the NPV condition implies the transfer condition 
but the transfer condition does not imply the NPV condition
NPV condition is more restrictive. The figure can actually explain many of the real life 
situations in the transfer market in a simple way, so we will explain it in detail. It may seem 
lengthy, but bear with us – it may prove h
Figure 1 Graphical representation of transfer and NPV condition
The red, horizontal line represents the NPV condition for the selling club: 
order to satisfy the NPV condition for the selling club, the transfer fee has to be on or above 
%& !": # ≤ 	 −  
%& !": # ≥  −  
 
	 −  ≥ # ≥   −  
ee that the NPV condition is an extension 
 
 because of the transfer fee
elpful. 
 
 
 
lary expense. 
buying club and 
, so the 
# ≥  − . In 
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 this line. The blue, sloping line is the NPV condition for the buying club: # ≤ 	 − . The 
transfer fee has to be on or below this line in order to satisfy the NPV condition for the buying 
club. Where the two lines cross, we have the transfer condition, 	 −  =  − , which 
is independent of the transfer fee. 
In area 1, to the right of the transfer condition line, the transfer condition is not satisfied: 
	 −  <  −  , ∀ #. In real life this can explain a situation where a smaller club goes 
after a player from a bigger club, and that player is important for the bigger club. Then IR will 
often be less than DR, and the player will typically not settle for less than his current 
compensation: the transfer breaks down. That is why you rarely see ‘good’ players, in the 
sense that they are important for the bigger club, moving from big clubs to smaller clubs. 
The transfer condition is satisfied in area 2 but the sum of transfer fee and salary required is 
too high for the buying club, giving a negative NPV, so they do not want to buy the player 
and a transfer will not take place. This is a normal situation when a small club’s star player is 
targeted by a bigger club, and the small club and/or player is too demanding. For the transfer 
to take place the transfer fee and/or player salary has to be set lower, for instance through 
negotiation. 
In area 4 the transfer fee is too low for the selling club, giving negative NPV, so they do not 
want to sell the player. A typical situation when an attractive star player from a small club has 
expressed his discontent and wish to move to a bigger club. The big club takes advantage of 
this and makes a disgracefully low offer. Again, this can be solved with negotiation. 
Area 3, then, gives the only set of combinations of transfer fee and salary that supports a 
transfer. The salary required and transfer fee is in an interval satisfying the NPV condition. 
We could have put a stricter restriction on the salary variable, SBC, for instance SBC>SSC, 
giving a vertical line to the left or right of the transfer condition line. A line to the right of the 
transfer condition line would then make a transfer impossible, and a line to the left would 
make the upper limit of the transfer fee lower and the lower limit of the salary higher. But we 
have chosen not to impose a stricter restriction on the salary. This is to preserve the possibility 
that, e.g., the player wants to join the BC so much that he is willing to reduce his pay check. 
Or that the player is unable to command a higher salary from the buying club, because he is 
past his prime. 
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 2.1.1 Central results 
It is time to sum up our findings. We have described a transfer market with three participants: 
The buying club, the player and the selling club. First we found the transfer condition saying 
that the present value of the player has to be higher in the buying club than in the selling club. 
This is because the buying club will have to compensate for the selling club’s loss, otherwise 
they will be better off by not selling the player. Then we extended this argument with the 
NPV condition claiming that a transfer should only take place if the clubs are not worse off by 
the transfer, i.e., NPVs of the clubs are not negative. Put in another way, for a transfer to be 
possible we need the transfer condition to be satisfied 
  ≥  , 
but for the transfer to take place we need the NPV condition to be satisfied 
  ≥ #
+ + ≥  . 
Using the conditions we then found that there is no obvious, unique solution in this three-
party transfer market, the transfer fee and salary need to be decided through, e.g., negotiation, 
and we defined the negotiation intervals. In the words of Rubinstein (1982): 
[...] the agreed contract [here: transfer fee] is individual-rational and is Pareto optimal; 
i.e. it is no worse than disagreement, and there is no agreement which both would 
prefer. However, which of the (usually numerous) contracts satisfying these conditions 
will be agreed? Economists tend to answer vaguely by saying that this depends on the 
‘bargaining ability’ of the parties. 
In the simple, stylised example we have presented thus far, we can use Rubinstein’s 
bargaining model (Rubinstein, 1982) to find a solution to the negotiation, i.e., what the 
transfer fee will be. 
2.1.2 First attempt at bargaining 
Rubinstein describes a bargaining situation where two parties have to agree on the partition of 
a pie. For illustration purposes we will assume that the player’s salary has already been 
decided. The parties, buying and selling club, know the size of the pie and they know each 
other’s bargaining cost, i.e., there is full information. In our example, the pie is simply the 
present value of the buying club less the transfer fee that gives the selling club a net present 
value of zero (the minimum transfer fee (see figure)). Further, they have to agree on a 
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 partition. That is, the transfer has to take place. If they agree on the minimum transfer fee, the 
BC will get the maximum NPV that satisfies the NPV condition and the SC will get a NPV of 
zero. If they agree on a higher transfer fee (a lower transfer fee will violate the NPV 
condition) the NPVs adjust accordingly.
Figure 2 Selling club’s PV of the transfer is minimum transfer fee
First the BC comes with an offer and then the SC decides whether to accept or reject that 
offer, which leads to either an a
the SC. According to Rubinstein, the outcome of this bargaining depends on the bargaining 
costs of the participants and who makes the first offer because the two participants incur 
bargaining costs each round they have to bargain. Here we will assume that the clubs have 
fixed bargaining costs each round. Rubinstein also describes the situation where the 
participants have fixed discounting factors instead of fixed bargaining costs but we will not 
use that approach here. 
One can think of many different costs that make up the clubs’ bargaining costs. For the 
buying club which we assumed had financial slack, costs could be lost revenue due to not 
performing well without the player. This cost is fixed f
match without that player. For the selling club it could be unnecessary salary expenses or, as 
is sometimes the case nowadays, financial distress costs. So let us assume the SC has higher 
bargaining costs than the BC. In 
they pay the minimum transfer fee and maximises their NPV. The SC gets zero in NPV. The 
rationale behind this is that bargaining is a non
minimum transfer fee each round until the SC has incurred so high bargaining costs that they 
will lose no matter how big slice of the pie they get. (Remember that they have to agree on a 
partition.) It would therefore be better for the SC to accept the first offer from th
the minimum transfer fee and NPV=0.
If the BC has higher bargaining cost than the SC, the bargaining model’s perfect equilibrium 
partition is given by the BC offering SC’s bargaining cost in the first round and the SC 
 
 
greement or a new bargaining round with a counter offer from 
or every round they have to play a 
Rubinstein’s model, then, the BC gets the whole pie, i.e., 
-cooperative game, and the BC can offer the 
 
 
e BC and get 
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 accepting it. That is, the SC will not be able to come with a counter offer before rejecting the 
first offer, and therefore the highest NPV the SC is able to get is an NPV of the whole pie less 
one round of bargaining costs. The BC knows this and will therefore offer the bargaining cost 
of the SC in the first round. 
This completes our model in the simplest case, with three participants, full information and no 
uncertainty. 
2.2 The more realistic case 
Now, let us make the transfer market more realistic and interesting by introducing more 
parties and make some interesting observations. By doing so, we will be able to form the basis 
of our to-be-developed pricing framework. First we will generalize the NPV condition for the 
buying club: 
!" = 	 − { ℎ  
  + ℎ 
+} ≥ 0 
So, what are these costs the club incurs? We have already mentioned two important ones – 
transfer fee and salary. Others include financing costs, player development costs, legal fees, 
bargaining costs, consultant fees and taxes, and these all drive down the NPV of the transfer. 
For the selling club it will be opposite. If they sell the player they will be able to save salary, 
financing and player development costs. Formally: 
!" = # −  + { ℎ    + ℎ 
+} ≥ 0 
(You may have noticed that we have not considered the cost of identifying the player. That is 
because we consider scouting for players an activity the club would have done anyway.) 
Some of the costs are decided through negotiation whereas others are obviously not 
negotiable. The parties which have negotiable costs (NC) have to negotiate with the club – 
and possibly each other – for the remaining piece of the pie after the non-negotiable costs 
(non-NC) have been subtracted: 
IR − {!2 3 #} − {nonNC} ≥ T ≥ DR − {costs}. 
Which is just a generalisation of: 
  ≥ #
+ + ≥  . 
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 Increased revenue (IR), non-negotiable costs (non-NC), decreased revenue (DR) and the costs 
the selling club saves are known sizes in the sense that they do not have to be negotiated. 
Focusing on the negotiable costs we can write the buying club’s NPV condition like this: 
!2 ≤ 	 − {

!2} 
This creates the bargaining situations we mentioned earlier and their outcomes depend on the 
negotiating power of the participants, as showed with Rubinstein’s model (Rubinstein 1982), 
and external factors. Examples of participants and factors are: 
• Participants 
o The player 
o The selling club 
o All the clubs that want to acquire the player 
• External factors 
o Tax regime, labour market legislation and general legislation 
o Similar players/substitutes players 
o Financing costs and other transaction costs (e.g. agents) 
o Currency, cultural and climate differences 
Without going into too much detail now – we will cover this later – we can give some 
clarifying examples. If there are many clubs interested in the player this will increase the 
bargaining power of the selling club and drive up the transfer fee to a level higher than the 
minimum or NPV maximising transfer fee for the buying club. If the personal taxation in one 
country is lower than in another country the club with the less favourable tax system has to 
offer a higher salary than the minimum or NPV maximising salary. If there are many 
substitute players this will put an upper boundary on the transfer fee. An illustrating graph 
may give some useful insight. 
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 The parties will then bargain over the area ma
It is time to end our introduction, and we do so with a repetition of our research topics: What 
value can a player add to a football club; and, how much will the club
player? Hopefully these questions have been motiva
we have created thus far. We have established that football players can add value to the 
and that it is possible to quantify the value created by each football player. Further, we have 
taken a first attempt to describe the mechanisms that decide the negotiable costs. Also, we 
have learned important relationships, such as the transfer and NPV conditions and the 
variables that constitute them, and we have described, in an easy way, how the transfer market 
with its participants works. This knowledge will be important in the continuing: We will show 
you that the NPV and transfer condition
this happens we need to explain how the owners of the clubs act, a side of the
we have not discussed yet, and how the transfer market works, in more detail.
3. The economics of football and the labour market
“The challenge for economic theory is to find a dynamic balance between love and money 
necessary to analytically grasp the passionate and pragmatic complexities of the beautiful 
game” (Vrooman, 2007a). 
Until now we have assumed, without stating it directly, that club owners are concerned with 
profits, but as this quote suggests, the world of football is different f
Figure 3 Identifying maximum NPV 
rked “The ‘pie’”. 
 have to pay for that 
ted somewhat by the fairly simple models 
s rarely hold in today’s football. To understand why 
 
 
club 
 football world 
 
rom the “normal” 
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 business world. Players are earning millions of Euros every year and the need to maintain 
club reputation and satisfy fans is extremely important for the owners of the clubs: in the 
supporters’ point of view, the winners in football are the teams that win most matches, not the 
teams that earn most money. The competition to sign the best players is fierce, which is 
reflected by the gross spending in the transfer market: E.g. the top division clubs in England, 
Italy and Spain spent a total of £850m on new players in the summer of 2010, before the new 
season started (Deloitte, 2010). Accordingly, we will therefore devote some time to explain 
how the football clubs act and how the labour market in football works, so we can develop 
realistic models for determining the transfer price and other entities. 
3.1 Models for football club behaviour 
3.1.1 Rationality and profit maximisation 
One of the first formal analyses of the economics of sports was done by Rottenberg in 1956 
where he studied the labour market, product market and factors determining demand and 
competition in American baseball. An important insight from this article is the necessity of 
uncertain match outcome, called the uncertainty-of-outcome hypothesis (Rottenberg, 1956): 
“uncertainty of outcome is necessary if the consumer is to be willing to pay for admission to 
the game.” He therefore claimed that the wellbeing of the whole league depends on no one 
team becoming too dominant, i.e. buying up all the player talent and thereby removing the 
uncertainty of outcome driving consumers away. The clubs are aware of this so player talent 
will be allocated just as efficient under a free market system (players are allowed to seek 
employment where they want) as under the reserve clause system (a system of transfer fees, 
which is the case in football). This result is called the invariance proposition. To reach these 
conclusions Rottenberg makes some assumptions that later have been questioned by several 
authors (Sloane, 1969; Carmichael and Thomas, 1993; Szymanski and Smith, 1997; Gerrard 
and Dobson, 2000). The first assumption is that (baseball) team owners are rational profit 
maximisers: “A rational team will seek to maximize the rent it derives from each player” 
(Rottenberg, 1956). Combining profit maximization with the requirement of uncertain match 
outcome gives an interesting result: the relationship between revenue and number of star 
players turns negative at some point. Consequently, at some point, a poor team will value a 
star player higher than a rich team, making it able to purchase that star player. The profit 
maximizing solution will then be a scenario where the clubs are nearly equal; in fact they 
have to be equal in order to have a sustainable league. However, equally sized clubs is 
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 certainly not the case today; nevertheless, Rottenberg is honoured as the father of sports 
economics (Fort, 2005), and in our opinion, rightly so. 
3.1.2 Win at any cost vs. sustainability 
A model made especially for football, were developed by Sloane (1969). He recognizes 
Rottenberg (1956) but argues that the football club is a utility maximiser – not a profit 
maximiser – subject to a solvency constraint. This is, to some extent,  also the view of other 
authors, e.g. Szymanski and Smith (1997), Gerrard and Dobson (2000) and Garcia-del-Barro 
and Szymanski (2009): They point out that the ownership and control structures of the clubs, 
amongst other things, determine how much weight the clubs put on profits and performance. 
We can think of other important factors that cause non-profit maximising club behaviour, 
such as demanding fans and wealthy owners only interested in sporting results. Examples are 
abundant of fans requiring new and better players and owners willing to win at any cost. This 
forces the owners of the clubs to focus mainly on sporting performance and satisfied 
supporters, and they will tend to maximise a combination of these factors. Not surprisingly, 
this behaviour will cause the NPV condition to break down on many occasions, even the 
transfer condition can be violated. Using the insight from figure 1, we will see transfers going 
through not only in area 3 but also in the other areas. An example may clarify this: A below 
top-tier club is bought up by an oil sheik wanting to create a trophy-winning team at any cost. 
To do this he will have to make huge investments in better players and we will see transfers 
going through in area 1. That is, the sheik’s relatively small club buys quality players from the 
biggest and best teams in the world. Facing this new threat, established top teams, not willing 
to give up their positions as top teams and loose revenues, have to improve their player 
material. In competing for the best players the transfer fees and wages are bid up, making 
transfers occur in area 2 of figure 1. This inflation in transfer fees and wages also affects the 
smaller teams in their pursuit for players, forcing some of them into financial difficulty. The 
need to sell off players in order to avoid bankruptcy manifests itself in transfers going through 
in area 4. 
Of course, there are owners out there who want to run their clubs in a sustainable and self-
financing way, focusing on “area 3 transfers”, but the fierce competition from other clubs 
with different motives, i.e. win at any cost, force these clubs to act in (somewhat) the same 
way because all clubs compete in the same environment. The result of this environment has 
been high inflation in transfer fees and player wages, devastating the clubs’ finances forcing 
many owners to subsidise losses every year (Drut and Raballand, 2010). UEFA, the European 
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 football association, has taken steps to reverse the money gallop in football and make it a 
sustainable industry, with its Financial Fair Play rules (UEFA, 2010a and 2010b). These rules 
will be phased in from the 2011/2012 season so we are bound to see some changes in the 
coming years. By not allowing owners to subsidise losses year after year UEFA hope growth 
in wages and transfer fees will normalise, and that the financial playing ground between clubs 
will even out. Without going into too much detail, one of the demands is that clubs break even 
with relevant income and expenses: 
Relevant income is defined as revenue from gate receipts, broadcasting rights, 
sponsorship and advertising, commercial activities and other operating income, plus 
either profit on disposal of player registrations or income from disposal of player 
registrations, excess proceeds on disposal of tangible fixed assets and finance income. 
It does not include any non-monetary items or certain income from non-football 
operations. 
Relevant expenses is defined as cost of sales, employee benefits expenses and other 
operating expenses, plus either amortisation or costs of acquiring player registrations, 
finance costs and dividends. It does not include depreciation/impairment of tangible 
fixed assets, amortisation/impairment of intangible fixed assets (other than player 
registrations), expenditure on youth development activities, expenditure on community 
development activities, any other non-monetary items, finance costs directly 
attributable to the construction of tangible fixed assets, tax expenses or certain 
expenses from non-football operations. (UEFA, 2010a) 
However, the clubs are given a yearly acceptable deviation in the break even result of €30m to 
€45m until 2018, to soften the transition period. Confront the report (UEFA, 2010a) for more 
details, it is an interesting read. In our eyes, UEFA is being way too nice. 
3.1.3. The football club as a revenue maximiser 
Club behaviour will probably not change because of stricter financial regulation (as we just 
showed, it is not strict at all!). Owners will still want to maximise number of wins and fan 
satisfaction but the Financial Fair Play rules will work as a limit on how much they can spend: 
In the future, the NPV condition cannot be violated anymore, at least not in the same degree 
as before. We predict – acknowledging the pitfalls – that “area 3 transfers” (see figure 1) will 
be the norm in the future. Until that “future state”, however, we need to rewrite our NPV 
condition: 
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 NPV?@ = IR − nonNC − NC ≥ Lower limit?@ 
NPVH@ = T − DR + {costs} ≥ Lower limitH@ 
Note that “lower limit” is team specific and that our previous, neat, relationship no longer 
holds: 
  ≷ #
+ + ≷  . 
However, we will use our previous relationships for analytical purposes as they offer a great 
deal of insight. 
Formally we can express club behaviour like this: 
Max F(Winning, supporter satisfaction) 
subject to  
Break even result (as de[ined by UEFA) ≥ lower limit 
and other club speci[ic constraints 
One is tempted to say that maximising wins will also maximise fan satisfaction, but we want 
to preserve the possibility that fans have other wishes than solely to maximise winning: For 
instance to play aesthetic football, to have players from their home country, to have a club 
that is run in a financially sustainable way, etc. Szymanski (1998) supports our view stating 
that having supporters and recruiting new supporters is important for any football team, also 
in a financial sense. Potential supporters are likely to choose strong brands instead of less 
well-known brands, and that the decision will be influenced by what teams are popular at that 
time. Hence, owners of strong brands and popular teams – as well as owners of less popular 
teams – have incentive to maintain and improve the club’s image, and assembling a team with 
popular and good footballers is likely to do so. 
For modelling purposes we will assume that maximising wins (performance) and fan 
satisfaction is the same as maximising revenue. This is an assumption easily defended. 
Barajas, Fernandez-Jardon and Crolley (2005) found sports performance to explain the main 
revenue streams for Spanish professional football clubs, so winning more games give higher 
revenues. Performance’s effect on revenues is also shown with the economic impact of being 
relegated or promoted from a division: “The mean revenues for English Premier League 
teams in the sample is about £28 million, the mean revenues for English Division One teams 
is only about £6 million, and mean revenues for English Division 3 is a mere £1.5 million” 
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 (Amir and Livne, 2005). For a football club in the top French division, Ligue 1, to be 
relegated to Ligue 2 means on average an 80% loss of revenue (Drut and Raballand, 2010). 
Blackpool Football Club (an English Premier League club) manager Ian Holloway claimed 
his star player Charlie Adam could be worth “£46m” when you consider the opportunity cost 
of relegation (guardian.co.uk, 21.01.2011). All of these examples illustrate the close 
relationship between performance and revenue and how important performance is for 
revenue. 
The other part of the object function, supporter satisfaction, concerns the customers of the 
club. Many clubs have fans all over the world, either following the club on TV and internet or 
live at the stadium. So pleasing fans is essentially the same as pleasing your customers, and 
happy customers are buying customers. Whether it is increased sales of stadium tickets or 
merchandise, or more people viewing the match on TV, satisfying fans has a clear effect on 
the revenues of the club. We will elaborate on the clubs’ main sources of revenue and how a 
player can affect them, shortly. Our model for club behaviour is now done. We can express it 
like this: 
a3 
 
b  
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
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
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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This simple model can help explain clubs’ behaviour in the transfer market; they will seek out 
players that increase performance and/or increase fan satisfaction because this will increase, 
or maximise, the club’s revenue. In the first part of our thesis we will therefore create a 
framework for identifying which revenue sources a player can affect and how he can affect 
them, this is the Increased Revenue (IR) variable in the NPV condition. Then we will try to 
quantify IR in money terms – recognizing the uncertainties concerning a player’s revenue 
generating abilities – with stochastic modelling. Once this is done, the transfer price and wage 
have to be decided (and other costs as well), and even though the clubs act as revenue 
maximisers – not profit maximisers – there is no reason to believe that they want to pay more 
than they have to, in player wage and transfer fee. We will therefore create a framework for 
how these sizes can be decided. And that is it. At the end we will hopefully be able to answer 
our research topics: What value can a player add to the owners of the club; and, how much 
will they the club to pay for that player? 
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 Before we start to answer our research topics we need to elaborate on one more side of the 
football world, namely the labour market. 
3.2 The labour market 
It is necessary to explain how the labour market, hereunder transfer market, work in 
professional football in order to describe how transfer fees and player wages are determined. 
The most visible difference from the “normal” labour market is that football players can not 
quit their “job” as easily as a worker in a company. Football players are bound to a club with 
a contract. However, in the last 60 years the labour market has changed markedly, giving 
more freedom and power to the players. Following Sloane (1969): up until 1961 the transfer 
market had similar characteristics of a slave market, there was a maximum wage and unless 
the club agreed to sell a player, he was bound to that club for as long as they wanted him – a 
so-called retain and transfer system. In 1961 maximum wage was abolished and in 1963 the 
retain and transfer system was altered somewhat, but a transfer fee would still have to be paid 
if the club wanted so: “The retain and transfer system is therefore the linchpin of the football 
labour market, and despite many years of pressure by the union, its basic tenet that a club has 
the right to claim a fee for the loss of service of a player remains intact” (Sloane, 1969). The 
function of this system was to prevent too big differences between clubs, i.e. concentration of 
star players in a few clubs. Under the retain and transfer system, smaller clubs where 
guaranteed financial compensation (a transfer fee) for their players if bigger clubs wanted 
them. This, it was argued, gave incentive to train and develop player talents because the clubs 
were certain to be compensated for their investments in player development. 
3.2.1 The Bosman ruling 
A verdict by the European Court of Justice in December 1995, however, ended the prevailing 
retain and transfer system, at least in the EU which is the biggest football market. The verdict 
popularly referred to as the Bosman ruling, states that article 48 of the EEC treaty also applies 
to football (Judgment of the Court of Justice, Bosman, Case C_415/93, 15 December 1995). 
This ruling meant that football was to be considered an economic activity and therefore 
subject to the provisions of the treaty of Rome regarding freedom of movement. In practice, 
this gives a football player whose contract is expired the right to seek employment wherever 
he wants, without the club getting any compensation. This, as already explained, was not the 
case before the Bosman ruling; before, the clubs would get compensation when losing out-of-
contract players. Another implication of the Bosman verdict was that clubs in the EU could 
employ and use as many EU-citizens, and citizens from nations with agreements with the EU 
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 (e.g. Russia and Norway), as they wanted; before the verdict they could only use up to three 
foreigners. Citizens from outside the “Bosman area”, however, are still subject to national 
regulations which can differ from football association to football association, and these 
regulations are, in general, more restrictive: 
For instance, Germany adopted sport specific rules (Arbeitsaufenthalteverordnung 
amendment) stipulating that work permits will be issued exclusively to non-EU 
foreign athletes which will play for teams in the respective highest league in each 
sport. In France, players must have at least one International cap. In the UK, a player 
must have performed in 75% of the internationals in the last 2 years for which his 
country have played and the country must be in the FIFA Top 70. (Osselaer, 2008) 
We will come back to the Bosman verdict’s implications on transfer fee and player wage 
later. 
3.2.2 General regulations from FIFA 
More general regulations are given by FIFA, the international football association. The FIFA 
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (FIFA, 2010) states that: 
Players may only be registered during one of the two annual registration periods fixed 
by the relevant association. [...] The first registration period shall begin after the 
completion of the season and shall normally end before the new season starts. This 
period may not exceed twelve weeks. The second registration period shall normally 
occur in the middle of the season and may not exceed four weeks. 
This means that the transfer market is only open two times a year, so-called transfer windows. 
For the big leagues (England, Italy, Spain, Germany and France) the transfer window is open 
in July, August and January. Thus, players may only change club two times a year. Further: 
A contract between a professional and a club may only be terminated upon expiry of 
the term of the contract or by mutual agreement. [Or] A contract may be terminated by 
either party without consequences of any kind (either payment of compensation or 
imposition of sporting sanctions) where there is just cause. (FIFA, 2010) 
Needless to say the transfer market is not frictionless; clubs are not allowed to sign players 
whenever they want, and neither club nor player is allowed to unilaterally terminate the 
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 contract without just cause. Established professionals may, however, under some 
circumstances terminate their contract: 
An established professional who has, in the course of the season, appeared in fewer 
than ten per cent of the official matches in which his club has been involved may 
terminate his contract prematurely on the ground of sporting just cause. (FIFA, 2010) 
Further, clubs are not allowed to offer contracts with contract length above 5 years, and for 
players under the age of 18 the maximum contract length is only 3 years. 
If a contract is terminated without just cause the breaching party have to pay compensation for 
training expenses, and in case the player is the breaching party he is suspended from playing 
professional football from four to six months. If a new club signs such a player, it will be 
suspended from the transfer market the next two transfer windows. This was the case when 
Chelsea FC, an English Premier League club, signed French super talent Gaël Kakuta from 
French top division club, RC Lens (Gibson, 2009). FIFA accused Chelsea of inducing the 
young Frenchman to break his contract with RC Lens without just cause. Consequently, 
Chelsea was banned from the next two transfer windows, Kakuta was banned for four months, 
and they both had to pay fines and compensation to the former club for training and 
development expenses, totalling €910.000. The transfer window ban was lifted, however, 
after Chelsea appealed the ruling (BBC.co.uk, 04.02.2010) and the two clubs and the player 
agreed that Kakuta’s contract with RC Lens was invalid. This brings us over to another topic: 
the process of how a player is transferred. 
3.2.3 The transfer from A to Z 
In Sanghera (2007) there is an interview with a football agent explaining all sides of the 
transfer process. We will draw heavily on the insight from that interview but present it in a 
different way, more suiting for our purpose. 
Basically there are three types of scenarios that trigger a transfer: 
1. Interested club(s) approach current player’s club 
2. Current player’s club approach other clubs because they want to get rid of a player 
3. A player is out of contract and in search for a new club 
The only procedural difference between the two first transfer triggers is who makes the initial 
contact: buying or selling club. Apart from that, the process is the same: first the clubs have to 
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 agree on a transfer fee; then the personal terms are negotiated between buying club and the 
player. If one of these processes break down there will be no deal and no transfer. Note that 
the transfer fee negotiation is a process which does not include the player; in fact, it is illegal 
for a club to contact the player directly – a process called “tapping up” – and it may result in 
heavy fines (Fletcher, 2005). 
Once a transfer fee has been agreed upon – a negotiation process which can take a long time – 
the club and the player have to agree on the personal terms. Often an agent will assist the 
player in this process. 
Professional and financial issues will be taken into consideration such as: whether the 
player is going to play, the wage and the length of the contract. It is a bit of negotiation 
and compromise. The agent wants to realise a player’s value to a club while the club 
will be looking to minimise their outlay as much as they can. [...] If a number of clubs 
have agreed a fee for a player then he will weigh up a number of aspects. These may 
include whether he is going to play more at one club than another, the package he is 
getting and how much he will have to uproot his family. It often comes down to a wide 
range of reasons but for most players, first and foremost, it can be about how many 
minutes on the pitch they are going to get. (Sanghera, 2007) 
Both of these negotiations can take place outside the transfer window described earlier, but 
the player cannot move to the new club before the transfer window opens. 
The third transfer trigger, concerning out-of-contract players, is the Bosman ruling in practice. 
A player is out of contract for two reasons. 1) The club chooses to not renew the contract; or 
2) The player does not accept a new contract proposal. There are several examples for both of 
these reasons, but normally it involves the player being unwanted or the player wanting to 
move. Either way the player is free to join any club he wants, granted that that club also wants 
him and offers him a contract. 
3.2.4 Loan, option to buy, performance clause in transfer fee, third-party owners 
What we have learned thus far about the labour market, i.e. regulations and practices, enables 
us to understand the majority of player transfers, and it is almost sufficient for our purpose: 
after all, this is not a study of the football labour market per se, but we need a good 
understanding of it to perform our analysis. So, as the headline suggests, a transfer deal can 
take several forms and who receives the transfer fee is not always straight forward. 
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 Loans describe a situation where a player temporarily changes clubs: “A professional may be 
loaned to another club on the basis of a written agreement between him and the clubs 
concerned. Any such loan is subject to the same rules as apply to the transfer of players” 
(FIFA, 2010). This written agreement states the duration, normally from six months to a 
season but not shorter than the time between two transfer windows as players cannot change 
clubs outside the transfer windows; possible fees to be paid (these fees are less than the 
would-be transfer fee in case of a permanent transfer); and how the salary expense is shared: 
The player’s salary does not change since he still has the same contract, but the clubs can 
decide which is to pay the salary – owner, borrower or a combination. There can be several 
reasons why a club prefer a loan to a permanent transfer: Borrowing a player can help clubs 
without transfer funds to acquire quality players because they only face (possible) wage 
expenses; the possibility of lending a player short term can help a club with injury problems 
to replace injured players. These are win-win situations if the lending club does not need the 
player for a period, but does not want to sell him permanently, because they can save wage 
expenses. At the same time, the player will get playing time and gain experience at the 
borrowing club, which can help develop his skills and prepare him for play at the lending club 
in the future. This is often the case with talent development when a club’s talents are lent out 
to lower division clubs. 
The flexibility of the loan, however, does not end there: it can be combined with an option to 
buy at the end of the loan period at a predetermined price. When Italian top division team AC 
Milan signed superstar Zlatan Ibrahimovic from Spanish top division team FC Barcelona, the 
clubs agreed that Ibrahimovic would be loaned for the 2010/2011 season, with AC Milan 
paying the whole wage and given an option to buy the player for €24 million at the end of the 
season (ESPN, 2010). When we discuss asymmetrical information later, the flexibilities a loan 
gives – with or without the call option – will be revisited. 
As we have shown, the investment cost of acquiring new football players can be substantial. 
When you combine this with bad club economy which is the case for many – if not most – 
football clubs (Deloitte, 2010), the need to dampen the effect a transfer fee has on the club 
economy becomes necessary. Many clubs therefore prefer to pay the transfer fee over a period 
of time instead of paying everything upfront. E.g. pay half now and half in six months time or 
pay 80% now and the remaining 20% when the player has played 10 matches. In some 
countries co-ownership of players is normal, i.e. the player plays for one club but that club 
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 owns the player together with another club. Another, controversial, option is to involve 
outside investors: 
The practice of businessmen-investors "owning" players feels fundamentally repellent 
to English football but it is common elsewhere, particularly in Brazil and Argentina 
where so many brilliant players shine in a landscape of wrecked and insolvent clubs. 
Businessmen buy shares in the "economic rights" of young players, often paying 
initially for the players' training or accommodation, and then they are entitled to all or 
a big chunk of a transfer fee if the players do well and are sold on. (Conn, 2007) 
Trying to reverse or suppress this practice, FIFA has laid down strict rules stating that no third 
party can influence a club’s decisions (FIFA, 2010), i.e. change the club from being a 
maximiser of performance and supporter satisfaction. However, in principle we think third 
party ownership is an interesting way of financing and sharing the risks of talent 
development: The outside investor puts up the money for player development and gets the 
proceedings from (potential) player sales which he cannot influence; the manager runs the 
club and decides who plays, who is to be sold, etc. The legal framework is already there so the 
challenge is to enforce it. 
We have now tried to explain how the labour market and transfer market in professional 
football work. The main point is that the transfer market is a highly regulated market place 
where neither players nor clubs can do as they please. Yet – or rather, consequently – it is a 
complex market offering a wide range of opportunities. For our paper, the most important 
lessons are those of the Bosman ruling, maximum contract length of 5 or 3 years, the 
requirement to fulfil a contract, how the transfer process works, and finally the different types 
of transfer and financing options. This knowledge will especially help us to explain the 
pricing mechanisms and differences in negotiation power between parties when it is time 
answer our second research topic: How much will the club have to pay for that player? First, 
let us focus our attention on the first research topic: What value can a player add to a football 
club? 
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 4. Research topic 1: What value can a football player add to a football club?  
4.1 Possible valuation factors – identifying Increased Revenue (IR) and Decreased 
Revenue (DR) in the NPV condition 
As we have already stated, the primary goal for a football club is to have sporting success and 
satisfy supporters. To achieve sporting success, a football club must develop and acquire 
talented players. Carmichael and Thomas (1993) describe the latter: “The primary motivation 
for the buying team when seeking to acquire a new player may be taken to be team 
strengthening aimed at achieving sporting success”. Hence, sporting success, at least long 
lasting, will come at a cost – the cost of investing in new players. And based on UEFA 
Financial Fair Play it is important for clubs not to incur losses on their investments. Amir and 
Livne (2005) explored the contribution investment in football players have on a football 
club’s revenues and operating profit. They found the contribution to be significant and 
positive, but it lasted for no more than two years. However, it was not in the paper’s nature to 
discuss why player investments have a positive contribution to revenues. It is important to 
find out why in our framework. Szymanski (1998) studies what revenue sources increased 
performance will affect: 
As club performance improves, revenues grow as a result of increased attendance, 
higher ticket prices, increased sponsorship, merchandising and TV income. In fact, 
82% of the variation in revenue between the clubs in 1996/97 could be explained 
simply by league position. The same relationship can be found when we look at the 
performance of clubs over time: higher revenues flow from higher league positions. 
He also found that higher wage expenditure leads to higher league positions, because better 
players demand higher wages, and better players win more matches. Each revenue source 
mentioned in this article will be discussed later in this part of the paper. To make it more lucid 
we will focus on three main revenue sources for a football club: matchday revenue, broadcast 
revenue and commercial revenue (see Deloitte, 2010; Amir and Livne, 2005). How consumers 
contribute to these revenues and who the consumers are, is described in Mason (1999): 
[a football club’s product] is now sold to four distinct groups: first, fans who support 
leagues by attending games, following games on television and other media, and 
purchasing league- and team-related merchandise; second, television and other media 
companies which purchase the right to show games as a programming option; third, 
23
 communities which build facilities and support local clubs; and fourth, corporations 
which support leagues and clubs by increasing gate moneys, purchasing teams 
outright, or providing revenues through sponsorships or other associations. 
Szymanski (1998) has a theory of why fans support the teams they do. Having supporters and 
recruiting new supporters is important for any football team, also in a financial sense. 
Szymanski states potential supporters are likely to choose strong brands instead of less well-
known brands, and that the decision will be influenced by what teams are popular at that time. 
Hence, owners of strong brands and popular teams have incentive to maintain the club’s 
image, and assembling a team with popular and good footballers is likely to do so. 
In this section, different factors for the valuation of a football player will be identified and 
discussed. Our view is that an investment in a player is like any other investment. For the 
investment to have a financial value, it must generate a cash flow. The present value of the 
cash flows, or revenues, will sum up to the investment’s (here: the football player’s) financial 
value. It is important to note that we only consider the footballer’s contribution to the football 
club’s revenue, and not revenue the player might generate to himself in the wake of the 
transfer. If a footballer can produce a positive contribution to a football club’s revenues, he 
will have a financial value to the football club. 
We will present and go through each of the three main revenue sources (matchday revenue, 
broadcast revenue and commercial revenue), and describe how our two factors, ‘increased 
performance’ and ‘fan appeal’, affect these revenues. Note that the factors will affect all three 
revenue source.  
4.1.1 Matchday revenue 
Matchday revenue is largely derived from gate receipts including season tickets and 
memberships. In the 2008/09 season, the twenty biggest football clubs in Europe, measured 
by total revenues, had total matchday revenues of €1 billion contributing 26 % of total 
revenues, and they had an average capacity utilisation of 87 % in their arenas (Deloitte, 2009 
& 2010). These numbers underline the importance of matchday revenues for the football 
clubs. They also describe the potential for increased matchday revenues, either by higher 
capacity utilisation or by expanding the capacity (the capacity utilisation varied from 58 % to 
100 % for the twenty football clubs). 
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 The most direct way football players can affect the matchday revenue is by attracting more 
spectators to the football club’s stadium. Our two factors explain how this can be achieved. 
4.1.1.1 “Fan appeal” 
This factor will describe player specific aspects that can increase attendance on matchday. We 
assume increased attendance will increase the matchday revenue. 
69% of the European football fans say that their identification with and affiliation to a team is 
largely determined by the particular players the team engages (Brandes et al., 2007). 
Carmichael and Thomas (1993) state that a football club need to maintain a fairly stable team 
over time to retain consumer brand loyalty. These statements are fundamental for our “fan 
appeal” factor. It underlines the importance of assembling a team with the “right” type of 
players, and holding on to them, for the existing supporters to maintain their interest in the 
football club but also to attract new supporters. It also underlines the importance of avoiding 
poor investments, i.e. unpopular or disliked footballers. We find it reasonable to assume that 
interest in the club and its players is an important reason supporters visit the stadium on 
matchday. The term “supporter” in this context is interpreted as every person interested in 
visiting the stadium and buying a ticket to watch the team perform. 
There are only two types of players in the description of the “fan appeal” factor: a player 
either has fan appeal or a player does not have fan appeal. How much fan appeal the player 
might have is not important in this part of the paper, the importance here is that it exists and 
that it has a potential financial value for the football club. For this factor to exist, a player 
must have some special attributes. Literature on players with fan appeal, or “superstars”, 
suggests two main ways that stars attract fans: by outstanding talent and exceptional 
performance, and/or by remarkable popularity (Adler, 2006; Rosen, 1981). Only players with 
fan appeal have one or both of these attributes. Note that the performance of the team itself is 
not commented upon. The focus here is that one single player, a star, can attract fans, 
regardless of the team’s – and to some extent the star’s – performance. 
Other literature supports this statement: 
[…] outstanding players – so-called stars – play an important role in attracting fans 
(Brandes et al., 2007); A superstar can have an effect on the revenues of his own team 
beyond simply improving team quality. The superstar may have a “personal appeal” 
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 that attracts fans even after controlling for his team’s (increased) quality (Hausman 
and Leonard, 1997). 
Mullin and Dunn (2002) found evidence in professional baseball that stars may influence gate 
revenues both by their talent which is translated into field success and by their popularity; 
stars attract fans and generate disproportionally high attendance by their outstanding 
performance (Rosen, 1981); fans of team sports may respond to aesthetic athletes (McDonald 
et al., 2002); fans are likely to be attracted to contests with high-quality displays of skills 
(Borland and Macdonald, 2003). Some of the studies are on different sports than football, but 
we assume sport fans to have similar behavior. 
We can divide the “star” term into two categories: the kind of star that increases attendance 
only at matches played at home, a “local hero”, and the kind of star that increases attendance 
both at matches played at home and away (see e.g. Brandes et. al, 2007; Hausman and 
Leonard, 1997). If the latter represents an extra source of revenue, i.e. the football clubs share 
the gate revenue, it should be taken into consideration when valuing the football player. As an 
example, the English Premier League does not share gate revenue, while the National Football 
League (USA) shares the gate revenue 60/40 for home and away team (Simmons and 
Robinson, 2009). 
4.1.1.2 Increased performance 
Scully (2004) found that in Major League Baseball “the marginal revenue of a 0.001 point 
change in the win percent is $60,958 in 1990 and $200,160 in 1998”. This is a good example 
on how increased performance can increase a sport club’s revenue. However, it does not say 
which revenues are affected and why. We will now describe how a team’s increased 
performance can lead to increased matchday revenue. Increased performance includes one or 
more of the following three aspects of a football team: (higher) ranking, (more) wins and 
(more) entertainment. Ranking and wins are direct consequences of increased performance, 
and are easily observed. Entertainment, on the other hand, might be a bit more subjective 
from the supporters’ point of view. We argue that increased performance will lead to a higher 
quality of display, and thus increasing the entertainment value. Supporters might also find 
more wins to be entertaining in itselves. There can be a number of ways increased 
performance can be achieved. We will focus on the case in which a football club enters the 
transfer market and invests in new players to increase team performance. The new players can 
increase team performance on their own, or “alternatively, their style may give them the 
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 capability to raise the play of the rest of the team as a unit, a species of externality” 
(Carmichael, Forrest and Simmons, 1999). Note that these players are expected to have a non-
negative contribution on the team’s performance: if the investment turns out to be poor (i.e. 
the player has bad performances) the player will simply not be used and thereby not affect 
team performance. This can be viewed as an option, with the player’s performance as 
underlying. If the performance is good enough, the option will be “exercised”. Note also that 
these players do not necessarily have to be “superstars”. Most players are not superstars, but 
they can still have a positive contribution on the team’s performance. 
Increased performance (ranking, wins and entertainment) can lead to increased matchday 
revenue in three ways: more spectators in the stadium, more matches and higher ticket prices. 
The first is based on an assumption that increased performance will at least not lower the 
number of spectators and it will boost the probability of more spectators. So, our assumption 
is: on average, increased performance will increase the number of spectators in the stadium. 
Dobson and Gerrard’s (2000) paper on a theoretical model for transfer fees support this 
assumption. In Borland and Macdonald’s (2003) paper on demand for sports, they found 
“overwhelming evidence that attendance is related positively to home-team performance”. 
The latter (more matches) is based on the fact that the best team(s), based on league position 
at the end of the season, can get the opportunity to qualify for international competitions. The 
teams who qualify will have more matches than its national rivals who do not qualify, as the 
international competitions are in addition to the national competition(s). 
As a consequence of increased performance a football club can raise its ticket prices the 
following season. Atkinson, Stanley and Tschirhart (1988) found that “as a team wins more 
often, owners have been able to raise average ticket prices to increase gate receipts without 
reducing attendance”. They went on to quantify this effect, stating: 
Improving a season record by one win allows an owner to increase average ticket 
prices by $.12. Given the NFL [National Football League in the US] average stadium 
size and eight-home-game schedule, one added win increases the next season's receipts 
by $62,155. 
Increased performance can also have spin-off effects such as increased common interest in the 
team and its players. We postulate that this effect can lead to a bigger supporter base, and 
increase the probability for more spectators at the football club’s stadium. Consequently, 
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 increased performance can lead to higher attendance through higher interest from existing 
supporters and a potentially bigger supporter base, more matches and eventually higher ticket 
prices. Andreff and Szymanski (2006) found that duration of league membership is a 
significant determinant of base attendance, suggesting that teams which have kept their league 
membership, and not been relegated, enjoy higher attendance. This result highlights the 
importance of not being relegated, but also the financial benefit of establishing a newly 
promoted football club in its new league. Note that ‘increased performance’ does not 
necessarily imply a relative high league ranking; it can also imply the fact that some football 
clubs must increase their performance to not be relegated. To illustrate the economic impact 
of being relegated or promoted, see page 15-16. 
So far we have assumed that increased performance will lead to higher attendances and with 
that increased matchday revenue. This assumption implies that the revenue response to wins 
is elastic, meaning that fans, through attendance, will punish the club for losing and reward it 
for winning. Porter (1992) explains this through his ‘fickle-fan’ proposition: 
Seen in this light, fans have a large stake in determining the quality of the team, not by 
being loyal, but by being fickle. The more elastic the attendance response to wins, the 
greater the incentive of the owner to field a winning team. 
If the response is inelastic, the owner of the football club has little incentive to assemble a 
winning team, making increased performance an insignificant factor on matchday revenue. 
Hence, the elasticity in attendance response to wins is important for our ‘Increased 
performance’ factor in this section. 
4.1.2 Broadcast revenue 
Broadcast revenue includes revenue from both domestic and international competitions. In the 
2008/09 season the twenty biggest football clubs in Europe had a total of €1.6 billion in 
broadcast revenues, contributing 42% to total revenues (Deloitte, 2010). The broadcasting 
deals are either negotiated between the broadcasting network and the football clubs 
themselves, or by the national football federation. Attracting attention from the media and the 
broadcasting networks can be a lucrative business for football clubs, as the numbers above 
highlight. 
The development in satellite television, the Internet and other technological advances have 
“delocalised” sports. Mason (1999) describes the consequences of this “delocalisation”: 
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 […] the global marketplace has made sports less attached to specific places, 
particularly those which have world-wide appeal, such as football and basketball. In 
effect, fans of professional sports can follow the exploits of their favourite teams or 
leagues despite the fact that they may be operating out of cities in other parts of the 
world (the global following for Manchester United), especially those teams that 
feature local athletes playing abroad (the Irish following for English Soccer Clubs 
such as Manchester United, Liverpool and Arsenal). Satellite television, the Internet 
and other technological advances can only hasten the process of delocalisation within 
the European sporting community. 
This effect will also affect commercial revenue, as delocalisation of football will lead to a 
bigger and broader audience, but more on this under ‘commercial revenue’. A bigger audience 
will shift the demand curve for broadcasting rights for football up. The supply of football 
matches is fixed, as there are a fixed number of games and football clubs per season. This will 
lead to a higher price for the broadcasting rights, increasing the broadcast revenue. Greater 
television viewership will also translate into more expensive advertising time, reinforcing the 
competition for the broadcasting rights and bidding the price up (Atkinson, Stanley and 
Tschirhart, 1988). The development in the price for broadcasting rights support this statement: 
In 1992, a 5 year deal for the television rights of the English Premier League was sold for 
£191 million. From 2007-2010 the deal was sold for £1.7 billion (see e.g. Premier League, 
2011). 
4.1.2.1 “Fan appeal” 
Hausman and Leonard’s (1997) study on basketball games’ TV ratings give strong evidence 
of a positive superstar effect. This superstar effect is also present when controlling for the 
teams’ quality. So, if a football club has a superstar in the squad, it could experience more 
televised matches, because matches with superstars attract higher viewership, and thus higher 
broadcast revenue. 
Manzenreiter (2007) follow up on the “delocalisation” described by Mason, stating: “Since 
satellite TV has turned European football into Asia’s sport of choice, club managers count on 
the growing interest in their club once Asian players have contracted.” And, “Broadcasters 
successfully enlarged their subscriber base in line with the global movement of local star 
players, while the inflated audiences increased the marketing value of the team.” The local 
star players mentioned here is a new kind of stars, not yet defined in this paper. The criterions 
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 of these stars are their (Asian) nationality, and their ability to attract interest from their 
country, region and/or continent. Investing in these kinds of stars is like investing in a 
derivative on the new (Asian) market. One of Liverpool FC’s sponsors has made it clear they 
want the club to buy Asian stars, saying: “The markets in Asia and the Middle East are so 
nationalistic, they are very proud about their countries. One appearance from a player, say 
from Dubai in the Premier League, and you’d have the whole of Dubai watching it” (BBC, 
2011). Such an event would likely boost both the broadcast and commercial revenues for a 
football club. 
4.1.2.2 Increased performance 
Simmons and Robinson (2009) describe how broadcast revenues are distributed in the English 
Premier League: “the broadcast revenues that accrue to the English Premier League are shared 
between clubs in a formula that includes a proportion of equal shares, a proportion dependent 
on finishing league position and a proportion dependent on the number of televised games.” 
Of particular interest is the share of broadcast revenues generated by finishing league position 
and number of televised games. Football clubs can affect these shares by on-field 
performance, as high (increased) performance can lead to a high(er) finishing league position. 
Successful clubs will also get a bigger share of the satellite coverage, increasing the number 
of televised games (Baimbridge et al., 1995). The size of broadcast revenues depends on how 
much the television rights for the league is sold for, and that depends on the television 
viewership. The football clubs in the English Premier League can contribute to a favorable 
contract for the television rights by bolstering viewership through improvements in the quality 
of televised contests (Atkinson, Stanley and Tschirhart, 1988). 
How increased performance affect the broadcast revenue depends on how broadcast revenue 
is distributed and negotiated in the competitions a football club participates in. The main idea, 
however, is that increased performance is likely to give a football club more televised games 
increasing broadcast revenue. 
4.1.3 Commercial revenue 
Commercial revenue includes sponsorships and merchandising revenues. In the 2008/09 
season the twenty biggest football clubs in Europe had a total of €1.3 billion in commercial 
revenues, contributing 32% to total revenues (Deloitte, 2010). Multinational corporations use 
the popularity of sports, sport stars and sporting events as a marketing vehicle: “The alliance 
of sports and television was of crucial importance for targeting ever larger audiences, and the 
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 capability of sport to reach transnational customer markets appealed to these corporations” 
(Manzenreiter, 2007). Manzenreiter sums up how corporations use football clubs as a 
marketing vehicle: 
Nike turned out to be paying USD 400 million to the Brazilian national team for a four 
year period; cell phone companies such as Vodafone or Siemens paid USD 15,7 
million and USD 20 million respectively to be uniform sponsor for European top clubs 
Manchester United and Real Madrid; most Austrian football teams are occasionally 
renamed according to their current main sponsor company (e.g. former Austria 
Memphis Salzburg became FC Red Bull Salzburg in 2005), the Yokohama Marinos, 
Arsenal London (from 2006) and Bayern Munich play their home games in the Nissan 
Stadium, the Emirates Stadium and the Allianz Arena. 
The mentioned delocalisation of football has opened the gate for new consumers and 
supporters, and with that, opportunities for increased revenue. One way football clubs try to 
break into new markets is by arranging pre-season and promotional tours and matches in 
those markets. Instead of competing with established markets such as Spain and Italy, English 
football clubs can focus their attention on North America and Asia. 
4.1.3.1 “Fan appeal” 
Hausman and Leonard (1997) found that the presence of superstars will increase 
merchandising revenues. As an example, the superstar Michael Jordan and his team, Chicago 
Bulls, stood for half of the licensed merchandising income in the National Basketball 
Association (NBA). 
The description of a player with ‘fan appeal’ includes, among other things, remarkable 
popularity. In this section remarkable popularity should be interpreted as the ability to attract 
new consumers. Remember that consumers in this context are fans, broadcasters and 
corporations. As mentioned in the introduction of this revenue source, corporations use sport 
stars as a marketing vehicle. If a football club buys certain stars, e.g. local stars from East 
Asia or worldwide stars, it will attract certain corporations dependent on the corporations 
target markets. We have already covered some aspects on how a star can attract fans. Also 
interesting in this context is how a football club can use its star(s) to attract new fans. After 
Real Madrid purchased the superstar David Beckham, they went on a promotional tour to 
Japan. It is reported that during the promotional tour the shirt sales in Japan alone covered 
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 25% of David Beckham’s transfer fee (Manzenreiter, 2007). Even though this is an extreme 
case, it underlines the potential stars have on commercial revenues. 
4.1.3.2 Increased performance 
Commercial revenue can arise from multiple factors. It is likely that this revenue is based on a 
mixture of aspects such as a football club’s performance, history, players, fans, and the 
football club’s ability to attract more fans and reach new markets. The list is inexhaustible. 
However, we will focus on how a football club’s performance can affect the commercial 
revenue. “At the margin, fans and sponsors are attracted by success: so better performance 
attracts higher income” (Szymanski, 1998). In a sense football clubs are competing for 
commercial revenue, by trying to be successful. Increased performance might also trigger 
clauses in sponsorship contracts, due to for example more televised matches or qualification 
to international competitions. 
4.1.4 Conclusion 
We have now identified main sources of revenue players can affect and hence described the 
IR variable in the NPV condition. When looking for players, the clubs should therefore find 
out how different kinds of players affect these revenue sources. We have summarized this in a 
table: 
 Matchday revenue Broadcast revenue Commercial revenue 
Fan appeal Popular players 
increase attendance 
Popular players 
increase televised 
matches 
Popular players increase 
sales of merchandise 
and attract sponsors 
Increased 
performance 
Good performance 
attracts more 
spectators. Can also 
raise ticket prices. 
More matches, sell 
more tickets 
Good performance 
attracts attention 
from the media. 
More matches 
televised. 
Good performance 
attracts sponsors and 
increase sales of 
merchandise. 
Table 2 Valuation factors and affected revenue sources 
For the football clubs to be able to increase their matchday revenue, they must fulfil some 
criteria: the football club must be able to handle increased demand, either through higher 
utilisation of the stadium, or expanding the capacity of the stadium, and/or it must be able to 
increase ticket prices. For the football club to be able to increase broadcast revenue, it must 
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 have access to a technological infrastructure enabling increased viewership. In other words, 
the broadcaster with the rights to view a football club’s matches must be able to reach out to a 
relatively big and broad audience. To some extent this will also affect the football club’s 
ability to increase commercial revenue. For sponsorship deals, corporations want their brand 
to be exposed to a big audience. And merchandise sales will depend on the number of 
supporters, which is expected to increase with increased viewership. 
In our discussion we have described four kinds of football players. Players either have or do 
not have fan appeal, and they either increase or do not increase performance. Below is a table 
summarizing the different kinds of players and their characteristics. This table can be used in 
combination with the table above to see what revenues sources a player is likely to affect, and 
how this player will affect the revenue source(s). 
Player has fan appeal 
Yes No 
Player will increase performance Player will increase performance 
Yes No Yes No 
This is the superstar 
player, and is likely 
to affect all three 
revenue sources in a 
positive way. 
Choose this player if 
increased 
performance does not 
matter. E.g.: this 
player has huge 
commercial revenue 
potential. 
Choose this player if 
increased 
performance is the 
most important thing. 
E.g.: the club faces 
relegation or 
promotion, or the 
club can qualify for 
international 
competition. 
This player will not 
increase revenues. 
Do not buy. 
Table 3 The different kinds of players 
4.2 The valuation model 
With the valuation factor framework we are able to find out which revenue sources a player 
affects and how he can affect them. The next step is to quantify our findings from that 
exercise. We will do so by using our two factors – increased performance and ‘fan appeal’. 
Both factors include an element of uncertainty, as we cannot say for sure how a new player 
can affect our performance, or how popular and/or skillful the player will be in the new 
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 football club. The two factors can also change over time: a young talent will give higher 
performance after some training, and he can also build up fan appeal throughout his career. 
Also, a new player might need time to adjust to his new surroundings, which can delay the 
impact a player is expected to have on the football club, like on-field and financial 
performance. This effect may also depend on the player’s age: “Purchases of younger players 
with a promising future and high-value added potential involve longer-term considerations 
than those of older established players” (Carmichael and Thomas, 1993). Potential injuries the 
player might incur can also have an effect on these performances. Taking all this into 
consideration, problems of adverse selection and moral hazard may arise. 
4.2.1 The case of asymmetric information in football 
Carmichael, Forrest and Simmons (1999) discuss the cases of adverse selection in their paper 
on the labour market in football. They claim abilities and effort of individual players are 
“widely monitored and easily observable to a network of well-informed managers, coaches 
and scouts”, eliminating the adverse selection problem. Note that this is not a case of moral 
hazard, as this describes the situation in the transfer market prior to the transfer. If a football 
club has a well-informed network, it should be able to map expected impact a new player can 
have on the football club, and also different sources of uncertainty, such as injury proness and 
adjustment-period. However, there are also non-observable factors such as professionalism 
and personality off the pitch, commitment in training and dressing room disruptiveness. 
Carmichael and Thomas (1993), however, believe this to “be controlled to some extent by the 
‘footballer’s grapevine’”. Thus, adverse selection does not seem to be a big problem in 
football. Moral hazard, on the other hand, is the uncertainties associated with the player’s 
performance, behaviour, commitment and effort after the transfer. Carmichael and Thomas 
(1993) state: “Any potential for moral hazard would seem to arise from reduced commitment 
or effort after a player transfers”. However, we do not think this is a big problem. A player’s 
behaviour is observed many hours every day on the training ground, giving the club’s 
manager and coaches the possibility to remove unwanted behaviour in an early stage. Besides, 
contractual arrangements can help reduce some moral hazard problems. For example, a player 
can have incentives to execute a high level of performance through contractual bonuses. And 
if the player fails to deliver as expected, the option-like characteristics of the transfer – i.e. a 
player cannot have a negative impact on revenue – enables the club to remove the player from 
the squad and/or sell/lend him out. Alternatively, as mentioned under our presentation of the 
transfer market, a football club can loan a player with the option to buy him at the end of the 
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 loan period. If the player fails to meet the expected performance during the loan period, the 
football club will not exercise the option to buy. To sum up, asymmetric information is not a 
problem with football players. In fact, it is almost non-existent. The players’ qualities and 
behaviour are easily observable at a relatively low cost before and after the transfer, 
eliminating both adverse selection problems and moral hazard problems. This is an 
extraordinary feature of the football world, and a dream scenario for anyone having to make 
investments in human capital. As Kahn (2000) puts it: 
Professional sports offer a unique opportunity for labor market research. There is no 
research setting other than sports where we know the name, face, and life history of 
every production worker and supervisor in the industry. Total compensation packages 
and performance statistics for each individual are widely available, and we have a 
complete data set of worker-employer matches over the career of each production 
worker and supervisor in the industry. 
Although we did not state it explicitly, our valuation factors framework heavily depends on 
there being no asymmetric information. So, for the owner(s) and decision makers of the club, 
no asymmetric information means that they are able to identify attractive players – i.e. players 
who increase performance or supporter satisfaction – with the valuation factors framework. 
But that is not all. No asymmetric information will also allow the decision makers of the club 
to say something about how a player is likely to develop in the future. Consequently, we can 
now go one step further and address the uncertainties we mentioned in the introduction of this 
section. That is, how the player will affect performance and supporter satisfaction in the 
future and how we can quantify that in money terms. In our first approach we will implement 
the factor ‘increased performance’ in an existing model that treats the uncertainties with 
future performance stochastically. In our second approach we will try to implement the factor 
‘fan appeal’ in this existing model. 
4.2.2 First approach – implementing ‘increased performance’ 
Our first approach will draw on the paper ‘An option pricing framework for valuation of 
football players’ by Tunaru et al (2005). They use “contingent claims methodology and 
standard techniques in stochastic calculus to develop a framework for determining the 
financial value of professional football players” (Tunaru et al., 2005). The factor ‘increased 
performance’ suits their framework, as they price a football player based on his performance. 
To some extent, this also suits the factor ‘fan appeal’, i.e. the part of fan appeal that consists 
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 of ‘outstanding talent and exceptional performance’. In the following pages we will 
thoroughly explain their model. Then we will interpret it and develop and adapt it to our 
valuation factors. Finally, we will hopefully be able to include the fan appeal factor as well, 
concluding the first part of our research topics – What value can a football player add to a 
football club? 
4.2.2.1 Explaining the model 
The paper uses ‘Opta Index points’ as a proxy of how good a player is. The Opta Index points 
are a quantified method to establish the performance of a player. The Opta Index is a 
statistical database that tracks all goals, passes, mistakes, etc. a player does every match and is 
therefore a good proxy for performance. We will use the same notation as in Tunaru et al. Let 
T be the revenue for the club, N the number of Opta Index points for the individual player 
under evaluation, and S be the sum of Opta Index points for all players playing for the club. 
Then it follows that 
d = #                                      (1) 
is the financial value per Opta Index point for the club, and 
f = !d                                  (2) 
is the Opta value of the player. 
The writers assume the revenue (T) and the Opta value of the team (S) to follow correlated 
geometric Brownian motions. The idea is that S will affect T and vice versa. ‘S’ can also be 
be viewed as the team’s performance. An increased S is a proxy of increased performance, 
and as we have discussed, this is expected to affect the revenue. The differentials for the 
revenue (T) and sum of a team’s Opta Index points (S) are: 
# =  h# +  i#j 
 =  k +  lm 
where the first terms are the drift rates, and the second terms are the uncertainty. The 
correlation between these two processes can be written as 
n(jm) =  o 
where ρ is the correlation. 
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 The number of Opta Index points for an individual player is also assumed to follow a 
geometric Brownian motion: 
! = ! + !p           (3) 
Consider a football club as a portfolio of football players. Each player has some attributes that 
affect the on-field performance, represented by the Opta Index points, and with that the 
football club’s ability to generate revenues. The football club knows what N is today, but the 
future development of N is uncertain. In a financial perspective N is a single stock, and 
assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion. The stock’s expected rate of return, or drift 
rate, is ‘a’ with volatility ‘b’. See our comments for a discussion of the variables and their 
drift rates and variation rates. For all the players in the portfolio (i.e. the team), S is the sum of 
each player’s N. In a financial perspective S is a stock index. Hull (2009) assume that a stock 
index can be treated as an asset paying a known yield, e.g. a stock paying dividends equal a 
known fraction of the stock price. Thus, a stock index can be modeled with a geometric 
Brownian motion (note that this is an approximation) and using this parallel, S is assumed to 
follow a geometric Brownian motion. Hence, from now both N and S are assumed to be 
geometric Brownian motions. 
4.2.2.2 The money value of one Opta Index point 
First, we need to calculate the financial value of one Opta Index point. X from Equation (1) is 
a measure of how much a single Opta Index point is worth in financial terms to the football 
club. Apply a multivariate Ito’s Lemma to get an expression for the differential dX (see the 
appendix): 
d = (rh +  ls −  k −  oli)dt +  idj −  ldm 
d = rudt + dvis + ls − 2ilo Ω 
where 
u = h + ls − k − oli  and 
Ω = ij −  lmvis + ls − 2oli 
The next step is to find the differential dY, and finally find an equation for the financial value 
of a player. The writers have different assumptions as to whether a player is evaluated by his 
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 own football club or an outside club. In the former case they assume the Ito processes N and 
X to be correlated, i.e. the player’s performance affects the money value of a single Opta 
Index point for the football club, whereas for the latter case they assume the processes to be 
uncorrelated, i.e. the player’s performance does not affect the money value of a single Opta 
Index point for the football club. We will comment upon this after the presentation of this 
paper. 
4.2.2.3 The evaluation by an outside club 
Applying a multivariate Ito’s Lemma on the equation f = !d and assuming N and X to be 
uncorrelated, they get (see the appendix): 
f = (u + )f + xf∆ 
where dY describes the development of the Opta Index value of the player, and 
x = vs + is + ls − 2ilo 
∆ =  p +  vis + ls − 2ilo Ωvs + is + ls − 2ilo  
4.2.2.4 The evaluation by the player’s club 
The only difference from the above assumptions is the correlation between the processes N 
and X: 
n(pΩ) = z 
Applying a multivariate Ito’s Lemma, they get (see the appendix): 
f = f + xf∆ 
where 
 = u +  + {vis + ls − 2ilo 
The only difference between the equations for dY is the drift term (A+a or D). 
4.2.2.5 The effect of injuries 
Injuries will affect the money value of the player. The arrival of injuries is modeled with a 
Poisson process, as injuries are explicit events arriving at discrete times: “This type of 
stochastic process is appropriate for rare events and it has been used successfully in the 
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 insurance industry” (Tunaru et al., 2005). The intensity parameter of the Poisson process is 
the parameter λ > 0. Each player will have his own parameter, and the estimate of the 
parameter will depend on “the position of the player in the team’s formation, age, previous 
records, medical examinations, and so on” (Tunaru et al., 2005). The money value of the 
player is now denoted V, and is a function of the Opta Index value of the player and time: 
V=V(Y,t). In other words, V(Y,t) is the financial value of a football player determined by a 
football club’s revenue (T), team performance (S) and the evaluated player’s performance 
(N). Remember that the Opta value is Y=N·T/S=N·X. Consider now that the Poisson process 
representing the injuries only affects the money value V of the player, and not the Opta Index 
points Y.  Let l(Y,t) denote the loss per interval of time dt due to injuries. The expected 
amount of loss per interval in time dt is λ l(Y,t)dt. Then the return on the value of the player 
per time interval dt, using a risk free interest rate r, is equal to the expected change in the 
money value of the player minus the expected losses due to injuries: 
 = n|() − }(f, ) 
The first term on the right hand side is calculated by applying Ito’s Lemma and taking the 
expectation with respect to the Wiener process ∆. If the evaluation is done by an outside club 
they get the following equations: 
n|() = ~ + (u + )f

f +
1
2 xsfs
s
fs  
(f, ) =  + (u + )f

f +
1
2 xsfs
s
fs − }(f, )           (4) 
And if the evaluation is done by the player’s club, the only difference is the coefficient of 
∂V/∂Y: 
(f, ) =  + f

f +
1
2 xsfs
s
fs − }(f, )                       (5) 
Equation (4) and (5) can be solved either analytically or by resorting to numerical methods. 
Note that we assume the football clubs to be risk neutral. Hence the rate of return (r) is risk 
free. 
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 4.2.2.6 Modelling the value of the player as a jump-diffusion process 
Suppose instead that injuries affect the number of Opta Index points, N, for the player under 
evaluation. Tunaru et al. use a jump-diffusion process to model the value of the player in this 
case. They argue that N is a time series that experiences downward jumps when the player 
under evaluation has injuries. The change is made in Equation (3): 
! = ! + !p + (!)() 
where K(N) is the amplitude of the jump in N, and J(t) is a counting process representing the 
number of jumps occurring in the interval of time [0, t]. This process is usually a Poisson 
process with intensity parameter λ, which means that the probability of having a jump in the 
next interval of time dt is λdt (See Hull, 2009; Baz and Chacko, 2004). 
Suppose that the amplitude of the jumps is given by 
(!) = !()( − 1) 
Therefore 
! − ! = ! + (!) − ! = !( − 1) 
! = ! 
k is interpreted as the average jump size measured as a percentage of N. It cannot be negative 
and we get downward jumps only when k<1. Thus, we expect 0 < k < 1. 
Consider now the case where a football club wants to evaluate a player playing for an outside 
club. We need to establish the differential for Y=NX, which is 
f = (u + )f + xf∆ + r∆(f)t() 
where 
x = vs + is + ls − 2ilo 
∆ =  p +  vis + ls − 2ilo Ωvs + is + ls − 2ilo  
∆(f) = f!() + !(), d(),  − f(!(), d(), ) 
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 The authors see the value of the footballer as a contingent claim on his or her performance 
value Y generated from the Opta Index. Following standard contingent claim analysis (see 
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), they get 
n∆() = ~ + (u + )f

f +
1
2 xsfs
s
fs + }()  + ()a() 
where 
a() = () − } 
nra()t = 0 
() = f() + Δf(),  − (f(), ) 
Applying again the expectation with respect to the martingale M(t) they get: 
n(n|rt) = ~ + (u + )f

f +
1
2 xsfs
s
fs + }()  
 = n(n|rt) 
(f, ) = ~ + (u + )f

f +
1
2 xsfs
s
fs + }()              (6) 
The only difference between an inside and an outside player is the coefficient of ∂V/∂Y, as in 
the previous case: 
(f, ) = ~ + f

f +
1
2 xsfs
s
fs + }()                          (7) 
The interpretation of λG(V) is the expected loss in value caused by injury. Again, these 
equations can either be solved analytically or by resorting to numerical methods. 
4.2.3 Interpreting the model 
In the following we will make general comments about Tunaru et al.’s model, and we will 
explain the variables and their drift and variance rates. We will also interpret the different 
valuation equations, their terms and link them up to our two valuation factors. 
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 4.2.3.1 General comments 
Tunaru et al. assume the revenue T and the Opta Index points of the team S to influence each 
other. An increase in S can be viewed as increased performance, and as we discussed under 
the factor ‘increased performance’, this will increase revenues. Thus, we would expect to see 
positive values of the correlation, ρ. Looking at Arsenal FC, a football club in the English 
Premier League, they found this correlation to be about 80%. This is consistent with our view 
of the football club as a maximiser of performance and fan satisfaction, and that this is the 
same as maximizing revenue. 
If you consider S to be a measure of team performance, it is of interest to find the effect a new 
player will have on S. The advantage of using the sum of Opta Index points is that only 
players actually playing will be included in this sum, if a player does not play he will not have 
Opta Index points. Bringing a new player in can cause other players to play less, it is therefore 
important that the new player’s Opta Index points is higher than the Opta Index points lost by 
not playing the other players. In other words, the new players should be better than the players 
excluded. The effect a new player has on S is more interesting than the individual Opta Index 
points the new player obtains (N). As we quoted earlier, a player can have “the capability to 
raise the play of the rest of the team as a unit, a species of externality” (Carmichael, Forrest 
and Simmons, 1999). Thus, having an opinion of how a new player can affect S is important. 
Finding dT/dS prior to the transfer and applying the change in S if a transfer goes through, 
will give a football club the financial value of increased/decreased performance. Actually, we 
have already made a framework to find dT/dS – the valuation factors’ ‘increased 
performance’. Hence, applying our valuation factors framework together with the model of 
Tunaru et al. should give us a good estimate of the increased performance-part of a player’s 
value. Note that the use of Opta Index points is not necessary. The important thing is to 
quantify dT/dS, team and player performance, and how it might change. However, we do 
think Opta Index points are a good proxy for team performance and should be considered 
when assessing a player’s performance. As mentioned earlier, team performance includes 
ranking, wins and entertainment. The use of Opta Index points does not violate this view, as a 
higher S can lead to a higher ranking, more wins and/or entertainment. 
We support the paper’s use of a Poisson process to describe the arrival rate of injuries. The 
authors include injuries in two methods. In the first case injuries only affect the money value 
V. In the second case injuries affect the number of Opta Index points for the player under 
evaluation and Opta Value Y which subsequently affects V. We prefer the latter method 
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 (Equation (6) and (7)), as we think this gives a better understanding of how injuries affect a 
player’s performance: In the first matches after an injury, a player might need some time to 
reach his normal performance level. This will also affect team performance (S) which is the 
sum of each player’s performance (N). 
If an outside club is evaluating a player, Tunaru et al. assume the player’s individual Opta 
Index points N to be uncorrelated with the financial value per Opta Index point X=T/S for this 
football club. This implies that N also is uncorrelated with S and T. This is only true before 
the transfer takes place. After the transfer, N will affect both S and T and consequently X. If a 
football club is evaluating a player currently playing in another team, this club should ask 
itself: What will happen with our team performance and revenues if we buy this player? If a 
football club is evaluating one of its own players it should ask itself: How does this player 
affect team performance and revenues? We claim that there is no difference in these two 
questions. Hence, there is no difference in evaluating an outside player (another club’s player) 
and an inside player (the club’s own player). So, for an outside club’s evaluation to be 
meaningful, the evaluated player must be treated as he is playing for the club. 
4.2.3.2 Do the equations make sense? 
So far we have not interpreted the equations or commented upon the magnitude and sign of 
the variables, its drift and variance rates and derivatives in the model. The magnitude of these 
will most likely be determined by the individual player under evaluation and the football club 
itself. We will explain every part in the valuation Equation (6) and (7), both because we want 
to see how Tunaru et al.’ model fits with our valuation factors, and because we plan to use the 
model in an example later on. 
Individual performance 
This equation captures the expected development and uncertainties concerning individual 
performance: 
! = ! + !p 
We expect the signs to be universal for different kinds of players. For example, a young 
player should be expected to have a positive change in his performance, N. This translates to a 
positive drift rate, a > 0. For an older player past his prime this drift rate can be expected to be 
negative, a < 0. Thus, the drift rate (a) becomes a function of time. The magnitude of a will 
also depend on the player’s age, but we postulate that the magnitude of a will also depend on 
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 the current level of performance, N. Hence a will be a function of both time and performance: 
a(N,t). Consider a young player with a relatively low level of performance, N. This player can 
be interpreted as an unpromising player, and is less likely to improve, hence this player’s a 
should be low. The player’s performance over time, N(t), can be a parabola peaking at the 
player’s prime age, implying that the shape of a(N,t) is a downward sloping line. The width 
and height of the parabola is determined by, for example, how promising the player is and the 
player’s age. The width is a measure of how long the player’s professional career is going to 
be. We have illustrated this with a figure: 
 
Figure 4 Different kinds of players 
‘t’ can be considered the age of the player. Combinations of N and t (age) describe where a 
player is in his career and the future outlook. How a football club evaluate this combination is 
important in what valuation factors (increased performance and fan appeal) to use. We have 
summarized this in a table: 
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 Individual performance (N) today 
“High” “Average” “Low” 
Drift rate in performance (a), i.e. expected development of performance 
High Low High Low High Low 
Depending on how high 
N is, this can already be 
a star player. In any 
case, this player is 
likely to be a star, and 
might fulfil both 
valuation factors, at 
least increased 
performance. 
Depending on the 
player’s age, this can be 
an outstanding talent. 
Depending on 
how high N is, 
this can be a star 
player. This 
player can fulfil 
both valuation 
factors, at least 
increased 
performance. 
Promising player, 
most likely to be 
young. Have the 
potential to fulfil 
both valuation 
factors over time. 
Depending on 
how N is, this can 
be an outstanding 
talent, thus 
fulfiling ‘fan 
appeal’ 
Average team 
player at his peak 
level or past his 
prime. May still 
contribute to 
performance. 
‘Fan appeal’ can 
be both high and 
low. This is any 
player not playing 
in a top club. 
Can be a 
promising player, 
most likely to be 
young. Have the 
potential to fulfil 
both valuation 
factors over time. 
Depending on 
how N is, this can 
be an outstanding 
talent, thus 
fulfiling ‘fan 
appeal’. 
Unpromising 
player. Not 
likely to fulfil 
any of the two 
valuation 
factors. E.g. 
The authors of 
this paper. 
Table 4 Combinations of performance and expected development 
When a football club is evaluating a player’s performances, it can use this table to see what 
valuation factors the player potentially can fulfil now and in the future. 
We will now describe the variance rate, b2, in individual performance. The variance rate is 
positive, and multiplied with the Wiener process. (Remember that the uncertain outcome is 
due to the Wiener process, there is no uncertainty in the drift rates. E.g. the uncertain outcome 
in dN is due to the Wiener process dH.) The variance rate, b2, in individual performance, N, is 
a measure of variation in a player’s performance. When b increases, a player will have bigger 
fluctuations in his or her performance. Consider a player with a marginal style of play, i.e. the 
player often chooses a difficult alternative in preference to a simpler alternative. This player 
will most likely have relatively big fluctuations in his performance, as he might rarely succeed 
but when he succeeds he delivers relatively high performance. So, this kind of player should 
be assigned with a relatively high variance rate, b2. A high variance rate should also be 
applied to young players, still learning their trade. 
Revenues 
This equation captures the expected development and uncertainties concerning the football 
club’s revenues: 
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 # =  h# +  i#j 
We will now describe the drift rate (α) for the revenues (T). That is, how we expect revenues 
to develop in the future. Remember the three revenue sources and how the factor increased 
performance affected them, and the criteria a football club should fulfil to be able to increase 
these revenue sources. Based on our analysis we expect the drift rate (α) to be a function of a 
team’s performance (S) and some club specific factors describing the football club’s ability to 
increase revenue, i.e. the criteria just mentioned. In fact, we would like α to be a function of 
the change in performance (the reason for this is that a stable performance, i.e. dS=0, does not 
necessarily have an effect on revenues in our analysis, while increased/decreased 
performance, dS≠0, will most likely have a positive/negative effect on the expected change in 
revenues), and the club specific factors: α(dS,CSFT), where CSFT is the club specific factors. 
So, bringing in a player who fulfils the increased performance factor is a direct way to 
increase the growth in revenues. Unless there is an exogenous shock in revenues, not 
explained by the current performance, we expect the change in performance to affect 
revenues, and not vice versa. For example, an exogenous shock can be a financial crisis 
hitting, amongst others, the football club’s consumers. This can lower the football club’s 
revenues. In this case the football club might have to lower its costs by selling off players. 
The variance rate, σ2, in revenues, T, can depend on the economic climate and stability in 
team performance. Economic cycles will create fluctuations in the demand for the football 
club’s product. If a football club’s performance is unstable, its revenue can fluctuate more 
than for football clubs with stable performances. Unstable performance can frustrate the 
football club’s consumers and their propensity to consume. 
Team performance 
This equation captures the expected development and uncertainties concerning the football 
club’s performance: 
 =  k +  lm 
We have touched upon one factor that can change a football club’s performance (selling off 
players to lower the costs). Other factors affecting a football club’s performance, and its 
ability to change this performance, can be the current manager’s skills and his style of play, 
and the training ground facilities and the coaches’ skills. These are more or less club specific 
factors affecting the performance. However, the most important factor affecting a team’s 
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 ability to change its performance is the players. For example, the ability to attract new talent 
and to be able to invest in these talented players can increase the football club’s performance, 
i.e. investing in players that fulfil the factor increased performance (or exceptional 
performance in fan appeal). Thus the drift rate in team performance (γ) is a function of club 
specific factors (CSFS) and ability to attract and invest (AI) in talent which can increase 
performance: γ(AI,CSFS). Remember also that a single player can raise the performance of 
the other players, a species of externality. Buying such a player will increase γ even more. 
The variance rate (δ2) in team performance (S) is analogous to the variance rate, b2, in 
individual performance, N: When δ increases, the team will have bigger fluctuations in its 
performance. The obvious case of a high δ is when a team consists of too many players with 
varying performance. We have already commented upon the correlation between dS and dT 
(ρ). As mentioned we expect this to be positive. When it comes to the correlation between N 
and X, ψ, Tunaru et al. assume this to be positive in their example (we will go through the 
example later). We have now described factors affecting the drift rates (a, α and γ) and 
variance rates (b, σ and δ) for individual performance, revenues and team performance. We 
have marked the drift and variance rates in red (the Opta value (Y) is already explained): 
(f, ) = ~ + (u + )f

f +
1
2 xsfs
s
fs + }()         (6) 
(f, ) = ~ + f

f +
1
2 xsfs
s
fs + }()                     (7) 
where 
u = h + ls − k − oli 
 = u +  + {vis + ls − 2ilo 
x = vs + is + ls − 2ilo  
Finally, we will describe the presence of injuries and the partial derivatives ∂V/∂t, i.e. the 
change in value (V) over time (t); ∂V/∂Y, i.e. how much the player’s financial value (V) 
change when the Opta value (Y) change; and ∂2V/∂Y2, describing if the effect of increased 
Opta value (Y) on value (V) is accelerating or diminishing. 
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 The value of the player 
As the valuation model does not take any costs into account, we interpret the financial value 
(V) of a player to be the present value of his contribution to revenues. In other words, the 
financial value can be considered a player’s gross value to the club. To find a player’s net 
value we must subtract the present value of the costs related to the player (e.g. salary) from 
the financial value (V). We will come back to this in our example. 
Analogous to N(t), we expect the shape of V(t) to be a parabola peaking at the player’s prime 
age. When we use V(t), and not V(Y,t), we look at the isolated effect time (t) has on the 
financial value (V), and we do not take the Opta value (Y) into consideration. Thus the 
expected sign and magnitude of ∂V/∂t is positive and relatively large in the beginning of a 
player’s career, zero at the peak, and negative and relatively large, in absolute terms, when a 
player is approaching the end of the career. The width of the parabola is decided by the length 
of the evaluated player’s professional career, and the height (the value of the player) of the 
parabola is decided by how the player fulfils the valuation factors. Here illustrated with a 
figure: 
 
Figure 5 Value and length of career for different kinds of players 
Again, t can be considered the player’s age. One can interpret V(t) as the expected 
contributions the evaluated player will have on revenues. The contributions are current and 
future cash flows while the player is playing at the football club, which – in this figure – is 
assumed to be for the rest of his career. So, the correct interpretation of V(t) is the value of the 
48
 player if the player stays with the club for the rest of his career. Consequently, an offer from 
another club will have to compensate for all the cash flows the player would have generated 
in his current club for the rest of his career. 
If you change the word ‘career’ with the word ‘contract’ in the above paragraph it becomes 
more realistic: we cannot assume that a player will stay at a club for the rest of his career. As 
we have discussed before, a player will be under contract for a certain amount of time 
(maximum 5 year for professionals and 3 year for youths). At the end of the contract the 
player can sign for a new club without any compensations being paid to the previous club, 
unless he renews his current contract (cf. the Bosman ruling). One obvious advantage of using 
contract length instead of career length as investment horizon is less modelling error. The 
contract length is known, while the length of a player’s career is unknown. We will illustrate 
the value, V(t), of a player who has just signed a five year contract. The player does not renew 
his contract, and will be “worthless” after five years: 
 
Figure 6 Development in value as contract expires 
We have chosen a concave graph. The idea is that the closer the player gets to the end of the 
contract, the more will the value fall. So, the value will fall more during his last year (from 
t=4 to 5) in contract, than during his first year (from t=0 to 1). Note that ∂V/∂t is negative in 
this example. In the next section where we answer the last research topic, we will come back 
to this. 
Anyway, no matter how long the investment horizon is, the cash flows are risky and this risk 
is reflected in the discounting of the cash flows: The higher the risk, the higher the discount 
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 rate. E.g.: A young, unproven player will have a relatively big risk (high discount rate) linked 
to his expected cash flows over his contract period. Because of a relatively high discount rate, 
this player might not have a high financial value. Consider now the same player a few years 
later, ignoring the lenght of the contract. He has now proven his ability, and the risk linked to 
his expected cash flows are lower (lower discount rate). Even though the expected cash flows 
can be the same as when he was younger, the financial value of this player will be higher, 
because of the lower discount rate. The cash flow risk can be one reason we rarely see young, 
unproven players in big money transfers (ignoring the fact that the legal framework in the 
transfer market and labour market can prevent young players to be involved in (big) money 
transfers). 
Next up is the Opta value (Y) derivative of a player’s financial value (V): ∂V/∂Y. We expect 
value (V) and Opta value (Y) to be closely related such that V(Y) is an upward sloping curve, 
and ∂V/∂Y has a positive sign. We now explore the isolated effect Opta value (Y) has on the 
financial value of the football player (V), and we do not consider time (t). The change in the 
slope of V(Y) (i.e. ∂2V/∂Y2) can be expected to be slightly positive. This is because a 
relatively high Opta value (Y) can indicate that the player is a very skilled player, and even a 
star player. We have discussed the effect star players have on revenues, especially in our ‘fan 
appeal’ factor: Players with fan appeal can increase revenues in other ways than just through 
their performance. So, as Opta value (Y) increases, financial value (V) is expected to increase 
more because of talented players’ inherent fan appeal. Hence, the sign of ∂2V/∂Y2 can be 
positive. We have also illustrated this with a figure: 
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Figure 7 Development in financial value as Opta value changes 
You can think of the figure this way: A higher Opta value (Y) can indicate that the player 
fulfils one or both valuation factors to a higher degree, accelerating the player’s ability to 
increase revenues. Remember that when we refer to fan appeal in Tunaru et al.’s model, we 
only consider outstanding talent/exceptional performance (N) and not remarkable popularity 
as this is not included in the model. We shall discuss and include all aspects of ‘fan appeal’ 
later on. Note that in our discussion, ∂2V/∂Y2 can be a constant, i.e. V(Y) = aY2+bY+c, where 
a (>0), b and c are constants. 
Injuries 
Injuries will have an effect on how a player fulfils the valuation factors. E.g.: If a player is 
injured, he cannot increase the team’s performance, and if a player with fan appeal picks up 
an injury, his popularity might diminish during his absence. Both these examples will have an 
effect on revenues. How large the effect of injury is, depends on to what degree a player 
fulfils the valuation factors. In other words, the magnitude of the loss depends on the value of 
the player: a player with a high valuation fulfils the valuation factors to a high degree. As we 
mentioned earlier, we support the author’s use of a jump-diffusion process in describing the 
effect of injuries. The maximum loss is G(V), and occurs if a player is injured all the time 
(λ=1). If this is to happen to a player only fulfiling the increased performance factor, it would 
make this player worthless. Players with fan appeal might not be worthless. The reason is that 
a player with fan appeal might still generate revenue through his popularity, by e.g. 
merchandise sales, even though the player is always injured. The intensity parameter (λ) 
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 describes at what frequency rate injuries arrive. If a player normally is injured one month each 
year, the parameter is 1/12. As we mentioned earlier, a football club should have a reasonable 
assumption of what the injury intensity parameter (λ) is through its well-informed network. 
We have now covered all the variables, coefficients and derivatives in the valuation equations. 
Again, marked in red: 
(f, ) = ~ + (u + )f
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s
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fs + }()                     (7) 
We will conclude this part by summarizing how our valuation factors affect each of the 
variables, coefficient and derivatives. But first we will try to include the fan appeal factor in 
its full extent. 
4.2.4 Second approach – Implementing ‘fan appeal’ in the model 
In their model, Tunaru et al. only describe a player’s performance. This includes the whole 
‘increased performance’ factor, but only some of the ‘fan appeal’ factor. Opta Index points, or 
other proxies for player performance, can cover some of the ‘fan appeal’ factor if the player 
evaluated has outstanding talent and exceptional performance. But, as we already have stated 
several times, a player can also have remarkable popularity without this being reflected in the 
player’s performance score. And as discussed under valuation factors, we would like to 
include the factor ‘fan appeal’ in addition to ‘increased performance’ because it is consistent 
with football clubs’ behaviour in the transfer market as revenue maximisers. If we had 
included only the increased performance factor, we would implicitly have assumed that 
football clubs act as performance or win maximisers instead, and our models would be 
inconsistent with football clubs’ actual behaviour. It is difficult, however, to measure fan 
appeal, especially the part of fan appeal that consists of remarkable popularity. Note that we 
will not add any new parameters to the valuation model. We will only use the current 
parameters, and describe how ‘fan appeal’ can be included with these parameters. 
We think it is fair to assume that players with fan appeal can be split into two categories: 
They either have remarkable popularity, or they have remarkable popularity and outstanding 
talent/exceptional performance. The reason is that players with such a high level of 
performance that they fulfil the fan appeal factor will also have remarkable popularity. We 
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 have discussed how players with fan appeal will affect a football club’s revenues: These 
players can increase attendance (matchday revenue), televised matches (broadcast revenue), 
merchandise sales and attract new sponsors (commercial revenue). This can be translated into 
a higher growth in revenues, increasing the revenue’s (T) drift rate (α) The reason players 
with fan appeal can have such an impact on revenues, is because the number of the football 
club’s consumers (fans, broadcasters and corporations) will most likely increase in wake of 
the transfer. (In addition, the existing consumers might want to consume more in wake of the 
transfer.) Consequently, the football club might get a more “diversified” consumer base, 
which in turn can lower the risk in revenues. This can be translated into a lower variance rate 
(σ2) in revenues (T). Players fulfiling both valuation factors, i.e. players with remarkable 
popularity and exceptional performance, will in addition to the direct revenue effects on the 
revenue’s drift (α) and variance rate (σ2) also have an effect on a team’s performance (S). An 
outstanding player (high N) will most likely increase the team’s performance, increasing the 
drift rate (γ) of the team’s performance (S). An outstanding player might also lower the 
variation in the team’s performance, lowering the variance rate (δ2) of team performance (S). 
The latter will depend on how consistently the player has exceptional performances (the 
variance rate in his individual performances), or alternatively if the player can raise the play 
of the rest of the team – making the whole team more consistent. This externality can also be 
translated into an even higher drift rate in team performance (γ). 
When it comes to the partial derivatives, ∂V/∂t, ∂V/∂Y and ∂2V/∂Y2, we use the same 
discussion as before. The only difference might be the shape of V(t). The shape of V(t) for 
players fulfiling both factors will be wide and high, because their talent allow them to have a 
relatively long career, and their talent and popularity will lead to a high valuation. Players 
only fulfiling the remarkable popularity aspect of ‘fan appeal’ might have a shorter career, as 
they are not necessarily especially talented (low N). But, they will still have a relatively high 
valuation. The shape of V(t) then might be slim but high (see Figure 5). Let us instead, as 
before, introduce contracts and contract lengths. A player that fulfils both factors (star player) 
will start with a high value (V(0)), ending at zero value (contract expires) unless the contract 
is renewed, while a player that fulfils only one of the valuation factors (here we will call him 
“average player”), will start at a lower point, and also end at zero value. Here illustrated with 
a figure: 
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Figure 8 Development in value for different kinds of players, as contract expires 
Note that the star player has a higher (in absolute terms) ∂V/∂t than the average player. We 
will come back to this in the next section, when we answer our second research topic. 
For players only fulfiling remarkable popularity the Opta value (Y=NX) will be far from their 
actual financial value (V), because of the relatively low N. This can also be the case for 
players with outstanding talent. We touched upon this earlier in our table over N and a (Table 
4). An outstanding talent might have lower performance than older players in the same 
position, but the outstanding talented player is expected to give exceptional performance over 
time, in contrast to older players. Thus, players with outstanding talent are expected to be 
relatively young and have a rapid development (high drift rate, a) in their performance. Note 
that players with outstanding talent might not be remarkable popular today, but they are 
expected to be over time. 
We will now expand Table 3 from valuation factors and increased revenues, to sum up our 
discussion. 
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 Player has fan appeal (One or more of outstanding talent, exceptional performances and remarkable popularity) 
Yes No 
Player will increase (higher γ) team performance (S), through own performance and/or externalities 
Yes No Yes No 
Expected development (a) of individual performance (N) 
High Low High Low High Low High Low 
This player is 
an 
outstanding 
talent, has 
exceptional 
performances 
and is 
remarkable 
popular. Will 
increase all 
three revenue 
sources. 
This player 
has 
exceptional 
performances 
and 
remarkable 
popularity, but 
is no longer an 
outstanding 
talent. Will 
increase all 
three revenue 
sources. 
This player 
has 
outstanding 
talent and 
maybe 
remarkable 
popularity. 
Has the 
potential to 
achieve 
exceptional 
performances 
(and 
remarkable 
popularity). 
Potential to 
increase all 
three revenue 
sources. 
Player has 
remarkable 
popularity. 
This player is 
not meant to 
increase 
performance. 
Hence this 
player will get 
little playing 
time. 
Potential to 
increase all 
three revenue 
sources. 
Talented 
player with 
good 
performances. 
Depending on 
age, potential 
to achieve fan 
appeal. 
Potential to 
increase all 
three revenue 
sources. 
Player has 
good 
performances. 
Unlikely to 
achieve fan 
appeal. 
Depending on 
how much the 
team’s 
performance 
increases: 
potential to 
increase all 
three revenue 
sources. 
Relatively 
talented 
player. 
Depending on 
age, potential 
to achieve 
both 
‘increased 
performance’ 
and fan 
appeal. 
Expected to 
get little 
playing time. 
Potential to 
increase all 
three revenue 
sources. 
No 
potential 
to 
achieve 
any of 
the two 
valuation 
factors. 
Do not 
buy. 
Table 5 Different kinds of players – expanded 
This table is meant to give the club a quick overview of what kind of player it is evaluating. 
When the club has identified what kind of player they are evaluating, it can use the rest of this 
section to get a closer understanding of how the player will affect the club. 
4.2.5 Conclusion 
We have now implemented our two valuation factors (‘increased performance’ and ‘fan 
appeal’) in a model. We have also described how different categories of players can fulfil or 
have the potential to fulfil the valuation factors. Further, we explain what revenue sources 
they affect, and how this is expressed in the valuation model. Our first research topic (what 
value can a football player add to the owners of the football club?) is answered, and we have 
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 introduced our second, and final, research topic (how much will they have to pay for the 
player?) with the valuation model. The next step is to use our model on a real life example. 
4.3 Applying the valuation model 
We will now draw on an example made by Tunaru et al. (2005) and Tunaru and Viney (2010). 
In this example we want to use the model to find the financial value of a football player (V), 
i.e. find a football player’s current financial value for the inside club, and for an outside club. 
In the articles they analyzed the value of Thierry Henry, arguably Arsenal FC’s biggest star, 
over the 2003-04 season in the English Premier League. When it comes to the valuation 
factors, it is of the authors’ opinion that he fulfiled both. The player had exceptional 
performances throughout the season, consistently achieving higher Opta Index points than the 
average team score. So, the most notable feature of Henry should be his individual Opta Index 
points (N). In fact, Henry and his team’s performances throughout the season (2003-04) were 
so high that they won the Premier League unbeaten. Note that from here on out we will use 
‘performance’ instead of ‘Opta’, if it suits. The reason is that it is not necessary to use Opta 
Index points to measure performance; there are also other ways performance can be 
measured. 
4.3.1 The valuation factors 
In this section we will discuss how Henry might have fulfiled the valuation factors, and how 
this could have contributed to the club’s revenue. We will base our discussion on Table 2 and 
3. 
4.3.1.1 Increased performance 
Henry had a high level of performance throughout the season, and the correlation between his 
performance and the team’s performance was as high as 60%. It is therefore reasonable to 
assume Henry increased the performance of the whole team, both through his own 
performances and through externalities. So, through Henry’s exceptional performances the 
matchday revenue could have been affected by higher attendances, more matches (as the team 
qualified to the UEFA Champions League by winning the Premier League), and higher ticket 
prices the following season(s). The broadcast revenue could have been affected through more 
televised matches, both in the Premier League and in the UEFA Champions League. Finally, 
the commercial revenue could have increased due the consumers’ attraction of success, 
mainly through increased merchandise sales and sponsorship deals. 
56
 4.3.1.2 Fan appeal 
Through Henry’s exceptional performances we expect him to be very popular among the 
consumers. In addition Henry had an ambassadorial status off the field, which also underlines 
his popularity. Through the level of performance and popularity, it is reasonable to believe 
Henry attracted higher attendances, increasing the matchday revenue. The same goes for the 
broadcast revenue: his popularity could have increased the number of televised games, 
increasing the broadcast revenue. As for commercial revenue, we assume Henry’s popularity 
to have increased the demand for merchandise associated with him. This popularity could also 
have led to higher interest from corporations, increasing the revenue from sponsoring. 
We will conclude by using Table 3: Henry could have been placed in the column on the left 
hand side, as he fulfiled both valuation factors. 
4.3.2 The variables, coefficients and derivatives 
In the following, we will describe Henry using the valuation model. 
4.3.2.1 Performance points and performance values 
Henry’s average Opta Index points per match was around 1450, while the average score per 
match for the whole team (average S per match) were around 11000. To find the average per 
player per match, we divide 11000 with 11 (the number of players on the field), which is 
1000. As we argued, having exceptional performances will make a player remarkably popular, 
and Henry was (and still is) a popular player among the Arsenal fans. Based in the discussion 
above, we expect Henry to have had a significant contribution to Arsenal FC’s revenues 
during the 2003-04 season. We can use the performance value (Y) of Henry as a measure of 
how much he contributed to the revenues. Based on the club’s turnover and total Opta Index 
points during the season (S), they found the value of a single performance point (X=T/S) to be 
£417. If we multiply the value per performance point (X) with Henry’s total performance 
points (Y=NX), we get a measure of how much he contributed to the revenue that season. 
Based on these numbers, Henry’s contribution was above £20m. We have summarized the 
numbers (X and Y in £) used so far in Table 6: 
X (Arsenal FC) 417               
S (Arsenal FC) 415 000        Average S 10 921        
N (Henry) 48 600          Average N 1 473          
Y (Henry) 20 266 200   
 
Table 6 S, N, X, Y 
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 4.3.2.2 The correlations, drift rates and volatilities 
Tunaru et al. (2005) estimated the correlation (ρ) between the turnover of the club, week by 
week, and the team’s performance to be 80%. In other words, some of the revenue cannot be 
explained by the team’s (or Henry’s) performance. If it had been possible, we should have 
divided the revenue in two parts. One part only explained by performance, and another part 
explained by other factors such as fan appeal. Then we could have divided the part of the 
revenue (T), explained only by performance, with total performance points (S), to find the 
exact value of one performance point (X=T/S). But since we cannot do this, a player’s 
contribution (Y) might be (heavily) overestimated. One way to correct this overestimation can 
be to lower ∂V/∂Y, but have a positive ∂2V/∂Y2 to adjust for superstar effects. As we have 
mentioned, a superstar will increase revenues through more than just on-field performance, 
e.g. through higher merchandise sales. We would like to value Henry from his current club’s 
view (Equation (7)), which means we must include the correlation (ψ) between individual 
performance (N) and the value of a single performance point (X). Tunaru et al. (2005) 
estimate this correlation to be 58%. 
(f, ) = ~ + f

f +
1
2 xsfs
s
fs + }()                   (7) 
where 
 = u +  + {vis + ls − 2ilo 
x = vs + is + ls − 2ilo 
Next, we will use Table 5 and our discussion over the different variables, derivatives and 
coefficients in our analysis of Thierry Henry. The player was in his 27th year the in the 
summer of 2004. He was an established player; hence he does not fit the description 
‘outstanding talent’. However he fits the description ‘exceptional performances’ and 
‘remarkable popularity’. It seems like Henry fits in our second column from the left in Table 
5. We would thus expect a relatively low a (expected drift rate in individual performance) and 
b (volatility in individual performance), and a high N (individual performance). The 
correlation between Henry’s own performance and the team’s performance was 60%. As 
Henry had relatively consistent high performances throughout the season, we would expect 
both γ (expected drift rate in team performance) and δ (volatility in team performance) to be 
relatively low. In other words, Henry contributed to increased performance in earlier seasons, 
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 while in season 2003-04 he contributed to keep the performance consistently high. Hence, we 
should expect to see a relatively high expected growth rate (α) in turnover, and a relatively 
low volatility (σ). Table 7 gives us the numbers (Tunaru et al. (2005); Tunaru and Viney 
(2010)): 
ψ 0,58 ρ 0,8
α 0,07 σ 0,15
γ 0,13 δ 0,26
a 0,68 b 0,94
 
Table 7 Correlations, drift rates and volatilities 
The biggest surprise here is the individual drift rate (a) and volatility (b) in Henry’s 
performance. This can be explained by Henry’s dip in form around the middle of the season, 
where he delivered average performances (around 1000 Opta points) for some matches. 
However, he pulled himself together and delivered exceptional performances during the 
second half of the season. His second half of the season was actually even better than his first 
half of the season. This can explain both the relatively high expected drift rate, and volatility 
in his performance. 
4.3.2.3 Injuries 
Thierry Henry was a popular and important player in Arsenal FC, thus he fulfiled both 
valuation factors. A potential injury could have had a big influence for both the performance 
and revenue of Arsenal FC. The loss due to injury (G(V)) is thus expected to be high, as a 
potential long injury could cost the club the championship and wipe out most of his financial 
contribution to the club. However, Henry was only injured one week during the 2003-04 
season. The intensity parameter for injuries (λ) was therefore set to 1/52 (=0.019...). Let us 
assume that Henry’s expected financial contribution to Arsenal FC was £20.3m, and that this 
contribution accounts for both ‘increased performance’ and ‘fan appeal’. Let us also assume 
that in the event of a season long injury, Henry would give no contribution to the revenue. 
The expected maximum loss (G(V)) due to injuries is then equal to the contribution (-Y). And 
the expected loss due to injuries is then λG(V)=λ(-Y). We have summarized this in Table 8: 
λ 0,019              
Y 20 266 200     
λG(V) -389 735        
 
Table 8 Injuries 
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 We do not think our assumptions are too far from the truth, so we will use the numbers in 
Table 8 in our example. 
4.3.2.4 The derivatives 
Remember our discussion of ∂V/∂t and Figure 5, 6 and 8. We argued that using contract 
length (Figure 6 and 8) is better than career length (Figure 5). Henry had three years left on 
his contract at the end of the 2003-04 season. So, unless Henry were to sign an extension to 
his contract by the summer 2007 he would be worthless to the club in the summer 2007 (cf. 
the Bosman rule). Since we do not have enough data to calculate Henry’s financial value at 
the time he signed the contract (the contract was signed in the summer 2003) it is difficult to 
say what ∂V/∂t in 2004 should be. However, we assume this number to be -£5m for Henry in 
the summer 2004. In other words, due to the Bosman rule Henry’s value would be £5m lower 
the next summer, and the value would fall even more the next year, hence Figure 6 and 8. 
Then what about ∂V/∂Y? We mentioned earlier that the contribution given by the 
performance value (Y) might be too high compared with the financial value (V). The 
contribution (Y=NX) does not explicitly take e.g. the popularity of a player into 
consideration. Arsenal might generate revenue not only explained by performance (N), for 
instance merchandise sales and sponsorship deals through some of the players’ popularity (cf. 
‘fan appeal’). This revenue should be kept outside the revenue included in the financial value 
per Opta point (X=T/S). The management in football clubs should be able to do this, at least 
to some extent. However, we do not have that insight. One way to control this is to lower 
∂V/∂Y. E.g. an average player who does not contribute to more televised matches, 
merchandise sales and sponsorship deals will not generate much revenue, however his 
performance points might lead to a relatively high contribution/performance value (Y). This 
player should then be assigned with a low ∂V/∂Y, as his Opta value (Y) is far from his 
financial value (V). When it comes to Henry, a star player, we would expect a relatively high 
∂V/∂Y. Consider two cases: If his performances would have dropped, the team’s 
performances would have suffered (heavily), as would Henry’s popularity and Arsenal’s 
revenue. If his performance had gotten better, he would have become one of the best players 
in the world at that time. That would most likely have led to an even higher contribution to 
revenues. 
By looking at Equation (7) we see that ∂2V/∂Y2 must be a low number to avoid explosive 
values of V. Given the magnitude of Y (£20.3m), and our suggestion that V(Y) is a 
polynomial in the second degree (V(Y) = aY2+bY+c and ∂2V/∂Y2 = 2a), this comes natural: 
60
 Even a small ∂2V/∂Y2 will have a relatively large effect on V. As we have argued earlier, to 
control for any superstar effects, ∂2V/∂Y2 should be positive, but very small as we have seen 
now. 
4.3.3 The financial value 
All the terms in Equation (7) have now been accounted for. Let us apply the numbers from 
Table 6, 7 and 8, and suggest some numbers (based on the above discussion) for the 
derivatives ∂V/∂Y and ∂2V/∂Y2, and put it into Equation (7): 
∂V/∂t 5 000 000-£     
Y (Henry) 20 266 200£   
λG(V) 389 735-£        
D 0,763
B 0,954
∂V/∂Y 0,300
∂²V/∂Y² 8E-09
r 4,5 %
V 17 000 000£    
 
Table 9 The valuation 
We have used the same interest rate (4.5%) as Tunaru et al. (2005). With the numbers in 
Table 9, the financial value of Henry was £17m. The outcome coincides with our discussion 
of what ∂V/∂Y (relatively high) and ∂2V/∂Y2 (small and positive) should be for Henry. 
Without a proper financial insight in Arsenal FC, however, it is difficult to say what the 
numbers actually should be. One interesting connection can be drawn between the financial 
value calculated here and Henry’s salary. A single player’s salary cannot be read in the 
financial reports; however it is of the authors’ opinion that Henry’s wage was around £80,000 
per week. The contract’s length, signed in the summer 2003, was four years. By using a 
discount rate of 4.5% the cumulative wage cost of Henry would have been just above £14m, 
not far off the £17m calculated in the example above. 
The financial value in the model (V), can be interpreted as the value of the revenue generated 
by a player. Note that the costs are not included. To find the net present value of Henry, we 
can subtract the present value of the cumulative wage costs from the financial value (V). Let 
us assume that the wage is paid in full at the end of each season. The net present value of 
Henry in the summer 2004 was then above £5.5m: 
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 Wage pr week 80 000          
Remaining time 3 years
r 4,5 %
V 17 000 000   
NPV 5 564 308     
 
Table 10 Net present value 
4.3.3.1 Outside clubs 
Let us move forward in time to the summer 2006. Henry signed a new four-year deal this 
summer. Reports claim he got £110,000 per week (Harris, 2006). A year later, in the summer 
2007, Henry was sold for £17m to FC Barcelona (Tunaru and Viney, 2010). To analyze the 
transfer and the transfer fee, we must first describe the differences between Arsenal and 
Barcelona. After the successful 2003-04 season Arsenal experienced a drop in achievements. 
By the summer 2007 they were the 4th best team in the Premier League. In European 
competitions their highlight was reaching the final of the UEFA Champions League in the 
2005-06 season. Barcelona, on the other hand, had consolidated their position as one of the 
two best teams in the Spanish Primera Division. Barcelona’s European highlight was beating 
Arsenal in the UEFA Champions League final in the 2005-06 season. Barcelona was the most 
successful club of the two over the last seasons, and they also had higher revenue than 
Arsenal in 2006-07 (Deloitte, 2008). 
As we do not have access to the performance data other than that of Arsenal in the 2003-04 
season, we have to make some assumptions in the following discussion and calculations. First 
we assume that the clubs are quite similar: they are both among the best teams in their league, 
and they both usually qualify for the UEFA Champions League. To compare the two teams’ 
performance, we will use their achievements in the UEFA Champions League as basis of 
comparison, as this is the only competitions were both teams participated. Interestingly their 
achievements over the three seasons leading up to the transfer were close to identical. Thus 
we can assume the two clubs to have identical performance (S), drift rates and volatilities. 
When it comes to player specific performance (N), drift rate, volatility and derivatives, we 
also assume this to be the same in the two clubs. In our view, the most notable difference is 
the clubs’ revenues. Given our assumptions and the fact that Barcelona had higher revenue, 
this would give Barcelona a higher value per performance point (X=T/S) and a higher 
performance value for Henry (Y=NX). We argued earlier that Henry fulfiled both valuation 
factors in Arsenal. We will make the same argument and assumptions for Henry in Barcelona: 
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 Henry was expected to have the same status in his new club (Barcelona) as he had in his 
previous club (Arsenal). 
Note that the importance here is not whether these numbers and assumptions are correct, but 
to show how the model works. In the following table we will give a suggestion of what 
Barcelona’s value per performance point (X) is, and the subsequent consequences it has on 
Henry’s performance value (Y) and financial value (V). The only differences from the 
previous example are X, Y, G(V) and V: 
X (Barcelona) 450£                   
S (Barcelona) 415000
N (Henry) 48600
∂V/∂t 5 000 000-£         
Y (Henry) 21 870 000£       
λG(V) 420 577-£            
D 0,763
B 0,954
∂V/∂Y 0,300
∂²V/∂Y² 8E-09
r 4,5 %
V 30 020 553£       
 
Table 11 Barcelona’s valuation of Henry 
(We refer to our comments on the correlation (ψ) as to why we use D as drift rate, and not 
A+a.) The only difference between Barcelona and Arsenal’s valuations is the value per 
performance point (X). For Arsenal this was £417, while we have set X = £450 (converted 
from euro to pound) for Barcelona due to their higher revenue. This leads to a higher 
performance value (Y), injury-loss (λG(V)) and financial value (V). Remember the club 
specific factors for revenue. One interpretation of why Barcelona value Henry higher than 
Arsenal can be their ability to generate more revenue. This can for instance be the nature of 
their television deals, spectator capacity both at the stadium and television, and their status in 
geographical areas, like Asia and North America. Given that Barcelona’s revenue generating 
abilities are higher than Arsenal’s, Henry will generate more revenue for Barcelona than for 
Arsenal. In our example Arsenal value Henry to £17m, while Barcelona value the same player 
to £30m. 
Later we will use this example in our bargaining framework to argue what price Henry could 
have been sold for. In our bargaining framework, we will use the IR (increased revenue) and 
DR (decreased revenue) variables instead of V. As it is Arsenal that sells the player they will 
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 “lose” the revenue generated by this player, so DR = £17m. Barcelona buys the player, so 
they will gain the revenue generated by Henry; IR = £30m. The bargaining framework will 
also take the costs, like wages, into account. 
We have now answered research topic 1 with an example. Next, we want to find out how 
much a football club has to pay for the player.  
5. Research topic 2: How much will the club have to pay for the player? 
In answering the first research topic we have made an effort to describe and quantify the 
increased revenue variable (IR) and decreased revenue variable (DR) in the NPV conditions. 
The other three factors in the buying club’s NPV condition are negotiable costs (e.g. transfer 
fee (T) and salary), non-negotiable costs (e.g. financing costs) and the lower limit; and the 
three other factors in the selling club’s NPV condition are the transfer fee, costs (e.g. salary 
and financing costs) the club save if the transfer goes through, and the lower limit: 
!" = 	 − !2 − 
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!"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Let us repeat what we know about the NPV conditions: Apart from IR and DR, the biggest 
and most important sizes are transfer fee and salary. For the selling club the only unknown 
variable is the transfer fee; the costs, including salary and financing costs, and lower limit are 
known. For the buying club we will assume that transfer and salary are the only unknown 
variables; the CFO, or whoever is in charge of the financing decisions, will know the lower 
limit, how expensive the financing is and what other costs will accrue in the transfer. In 
addition, we assume that the clubs know each other’s increased/decreased revenue, costs and 
lower limits; i.e. there is complete information concerning these variables. We will, therefore, 
only focus on the transfer fee and salary paid in the buying club in this part of the thesis, the 
other variables are already known at this stage. Formally: 
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So the focal point in this, final part of the paper will be on the variables outside the 
parenthesis: transfer fee (T) is negotiated between buying and selling club, and salary in 
buying club (SBC) is negotiated between the buying club and the player. 
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 In the introductory example we did an effort to decide transfer fee by using a bargaining 
model loaded with assumptions and stripped for participants (Rubinstein 1982). Obviously, 
we will need to find another model that suits the real world better: allowing for more than two 
participants, include tax differences between different countries, include characteristics of 
clubs, players and market structure, etc. This is how we are going to do that: First we will go 
through relevant literature and see how the determination of transfer fee and salary is handled 
in the academic world; then we will evaluate that insight, augment it with our own 
considerations and merge it all together in a framework that shows how the transfer fee and 
salary should be decided, given the parties’ bargaining power. Consequently, in order to make 
use of that framework, we will have to find the factors that decide the parties’ bargaining 
power and analyse them. In fact, most of the attention in this part of the paper will be given to 
that task, i.e., finding and analysing the bargaining factors.  
In our argumentation and model creation process, we will make extensive use of examples to 
show that our assumptions and considerations are anchored in the real world. Finally, we will 
use the bargaining model to look at the transfer of Thierry Henry from Arsenal FC to FC 
Barcelona. The bargaining model will tell us what the transfer fee and salary should have 
been (from our point of view, at least). By comparing the results from our models with those 
of the real world we can see which party or parties that gained from the transfer. 
5.1 Literature review 
In 1956, Rottenberg posted the following question about player salaries: “If baseball players 
have, on the average, no skills other than those necessary to play baseball proficiently, then 
their next best wage would be relatively low. Why are they paid so much more?” On transfer 
fees, Rottenberg (1956) had the following view, which is the same as our view:  
The selling price will be not less than the player’s capitalized value to the team that 
owns his contract [this is the transfer condition]. It will not be more than his 
capitalized value to the team for which his product would be higher than for any other 
team. The price will fall between these limits, at a point determined by bargaining 
strategies and the player’s capitalized value to other would-be buyers [this is the NVP 
condition].  
In the following we will hopefully be able to give a more precise description of the processes 
determining the transfer fee and the player salary. 
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 The literature on the field is scarce and older articles are more or less outdated because of 
recent changes in the football players’ labour market, as explained earlier (the Bosman-
verdict, etc.); but some general insight can be obtained. Carmichael and Thomas (1993) 
describe a two-party bargaining situation with the buying and the selling club as participants. 
They check empirically if they can use the method of Nash (1950, 1953) which they call the 
Nash bargaining solution. The Nash bargaining solution is the transfer fee, f*, “which 
maximizes the product of utility increments; r(+) − trx(+) − t, where S and B are the 
expected utility functions of the selling and buying club, respectively, and s and b are their 
status quo, disagreement or threat points” (Carmichael and Thomas, 1993). Put another way: 
attributes about the player, the player’s importance for the selling club, and the teams’ 
bargaining power affects the negotiation outcome. This point of view is also taken by Dobson 
and Gerrard (1999, 2000) and Speight and Thomas (1997). Using proxy variables for player 
ability (age, goals scored, etc.), buying club’s bargaining power (position in the league, 
attendance, pre-tax profit, etc.) and selling clubs’ bargaining power (same variables as buying 
club) Carmichael and Thomas (1993) test, using transfer data from the 1990-91 season in the 
English leagues, whether or not the Nash bargaining solution holds. Their conclusion is that 
the Nash bargaining model can be used to explain important factors determining the 
negotiation outcome in the English transfer market. The selling club’s bargaining power is 
determined by the player’s importance for the club, i.e. “ability and crowd-pulling power”. 
For the buying club, bargaining power is determined by the club’s size and playing success in 
the sense that big and/or successful teams have less bargaining power (they pay relatively 
higher transfer fees than other clubs). The authors (Carmichael and Thomas, 1993) explain 
this by increased risk-aversion among big and successful teams, i.e., they are afraid of 
performing bad and losing reputation so they are willing to pay more for the players. Also, the 
big clubs often compete for the same players, further reducing their bargaining power in the 
negotiation over the transfer fee. 
This latter point is investigated and expanded further by Garcia-del-Barro and Pujol (2007) by 
using data from the Spanish top divisions. But they take a different perspective; they look at 
the determination of the player’s wage after a transfer fee has been decided. Effectively, they 
examine the bargaining power of the player and the buying club in a competitive setting (the 
selling club is excluded from the analysis). The authors (Garcia-del-Barro and Pujol, 2007) 
claim the football labour market contains two groups of players: the average players which 
are abundant, and the “superstars” which are few. In the first group the football clubs has 
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 monopsony power because the clubs are relatively few compared to the huge mass of players 
with average talent. According to economic theory, the clubs should then be able to extract 
monopsony rents from that group of players. On the other hand, the superstars are relatively 
few compared to the number of clubs that want to hire them; so the superstars are able to 
obtain monopoly power in the labour market and therefore extract monopoly rents. In the 
words of the authors (Garcia-del-Barro and Pujol, 2007): ”[...] rich teams will get big 
superstars and poor clubs get small ones.” Then they proceed to create a framework where 
players are paid for both sporting contribution and merchandising contribution; and, following 
the tradition in the literature, the clubs are not pure profit maximisers but utility maximisers, 
and choose the level of superstars according to that. The result is that the monopsony rents 
extracted from the mass of average players are paid out as monopoly rents to the few 
superstars, yielding zero profits for the clubs. In our terms, the NPV condition is fulfilled on 
average: superstars transfer in area 2 and the other players transfer in area 3 (see Figure 1). 
Even if the analysis is performed on the Spanish league the authors (Garcia-del-Barro and 
Pujol, 2007) claim general validity of their results, i.e., the football labour market is divided in 
two groups of players. Another view is taken by Rottenberg (1956). He justifies extraction of 
monopsony rents from team players because the clubs make costly investments in 
development of young talents, some of which never become good enough for the first team 
and thereby inflict losses to the clubs. 
Gerrard and Dobson (2000) use the argument of football clubs’ monopsony rent extraction 
from players’ services as a starting point for investigating the transfer fee. In their one period 
model, the value of a player for a team is the difference between the marginal value of that 
player’s talent to the club and actual wages paid. (Under profit maximisation, that equals 
marginal revenue product less actual wages paid.) The selling club has to be compensated for 
this loss in order for a transfer to take place, just as in our introductory example. The same 
reasoning is used for the buying club: it is not willing to pay more than the monopsony rent it 
can extract from the player’s services. Actual transfer fee will then lie in this interval 
depending on characteristics of the player and the teams. Then, using empirical data from 
1990-96, they find evidence of monopoly rents extracted from the buying club to the selling 
club, i.e. the transfer fee is higher than the minimum transfer fee (see Figure 2 and 3); but they 
do not find out which mechanisms that decide the degree of monopoly rents. 
Carmichael, Forrest and Simmons (1999) discuss which player characteristics that affect the 
probability of a transfer. They find that “The probability of transfer is highest for more 
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 experienced players who can score goals and who may have been on loan but have not as yet 
a long transfer history.” Another interesting hypothesis they post is that the remaining time of 
the contract can affect the transfer fee, but they do not have data to test this.  
Another focus in the literature is the effects the Bosman ruling, which we explained in the 
introduction, has on the price of the player and his wages and incentives to invest in player 
talent. In Rottenberg’s (1956) theoretical paper on sports economics he introduces the 
invariance principle we explained under ‘Models for football club behaviour’: the allocation 
of player talent is efficient under both the free market system and the reserve clause (retain 
and transfer) system. The difference is that under the free market system the players get their 
full value because no transfer fee is paid. What distinguish a free market system from the 
“Bosman system” is that a transfer fee still has to be paid for under-contract players. People in 
the football industry, however, thought the Bosman verdict was the end of transfer fees: 
“Pronouncements from a number of people in the soccer world in the wake of the Bosman 
judgement were indicative of the belief that transfer fees themselves would no longer be 
payable under any circumstances” (Antonioni and Cubbin, 2000). Time has proved them 
wrong; transfer fees are still paid. Experts have nevertheless expressed their concerns 
concerning the incentives to develop players after the Bosman verdict (Feess and 
Muehlheusser, 2003). 
Main findings are summed up in the table below. 
Author Method Interesting findings 
Carmichael and Thomas (1993) Transfer fee negotiation with 
two parties: buying and 
selling club. Bargaining 
equilibrium. 
Player, selling and buying team 
characteristics affect the 
bargaining power of the buying 
and selling clubs. 
Carmichael, Forrest and 
Simmons (1999) 
What factors affect the 
probability of a transfer 
Remaining time of contract may 
affect the transfer fee 
Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol 
(2007) 
Wage negotiation with two 
parties: buying club and 
player. Competitive 
equilibrium. 
Buying club extracts monopsony 
rents from average players but has 
to pay them out again as monopoly 
rents to superstars. 
Gerrard and Dobson (2000) Transfer fee negotiation with 
two parties: buying and 
selling club. Competitive 
On average, the selling clubs are 
able to extract monopoly rents 
from the buying clubs. 
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 equilibrium. 
Antonioni and Cubbin (2000) The effects of the Bosman 
ruling on investment 
decisions for clubs 
Transfer fees are still paid. 
Incentives for investing in player 
talent are not changed. 
Feess and Muehlheusser (2003) The effects of the Bosman 
ruling on wages, profits, 
contract length and 
investment decisions for 
clubs 
Players’ overall payoff is reduced 
because of clubs’ renegotiation 
power. Free riding on other clubs’ 
investment in talent lowers 
investment in talent. 
Table 12 Main findings from literature on transfer fee and wage determination 
5.2 Interdependencies and different market structures need to be accounted for 
One shortcoming we find in the literature is the negotiation setting: the authors look at the 
transfer fee negotiation and the wage negotiation as independent processes not affecting each 
other. In doing so, they possibly miss some key features of the transfer market, namely that 
the two negotiations can influence each other. Remember what we wrote about the transfer 
process under ‘The transfer from A to Z’: transfer fee and wage are decided sequentially. So, 
if the selling club has monopoly power and is able to extract a high monopoly rent from the 
buying club, the player will lose a lot of his bargaining power in the wage negotiation because 
of the transfer deals’ sequential structure, raising the probability of a break down in the 
transfer. Metaphorically speaking, the selling club will eat the pie before the player has a 
chance to sit down at the table.  
In other situations the sequential negotiation of transfer fee and wage will not be a problem. 
E.g. when the buying club has bargaining or monopsony power over both the selling club and 
the player, the sequential determination will not affect the outcome: the transfer will go 
through at minimum transfer fee and minimum salary (see Figure 3). Yet another example is 
the effect of the Bosman verdict: if a player wants to join another team because of higher 
wages or higher sporting performance, and that team happens to also wants the player, he can 
force his current club to sell him at the minimum transfer fee, i.e. the transfer fee that satisfies 
the selling club’s NPV condition, to the other club, using the threat that he will leave for free 
when his contract is expired.  
Another shortcoming we find in the literature is the market structure some of the articles 
assume to reach their conclusions. We do not want to assume that one market structure is 
valid for all transfers in our model: Some transfers can be explained as a competitive process 
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 with many competing bidders, while other transfers have only one bidder and one seller where 
the outcome depends on the bargaining power of the participants. 
In our framework describing the determination of negotiable costs, we want to consider the 
interdependencies between the parties and the different market structures that can arise in the 
transfer market. The participants in the transfer market – the player and the clubs – will then 
have to identify the conditions in which they operate and then choose the appropriate model 
for determining transfer fee and wages. The figure below (Figure 9) summarises our findings 
and gives a general explanation to how transfer deals are decided. 
From the buying club’s point of view 
1. Identify player that satisfies the NPV-condition using the framework 
2. Which club has bargaining or market power in the transfer fee negotiation? 
Selling club Neither Buying club 
3. Which party has bargaining or market power in the wage negotiation? 
Player Neither 
Buying   
club 
Player Neither 
Buying 
club 
Player Neither 
Buying 
club 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Worst scenario for buying club. Buying club will have to offer transfer fee and salary at the lower limit. Transfer may break down 
if the selling club abuse their bargaining or market power so much that there is no “pie” left for the player, or vice versa. Formally: 
NPV?@ = (IR − known costs) − T − S?@ = Lower limit?@ 
NPVH@ = T − (DR − costs) ≫ Lower limitH@ 
 
2. Buying club will have to pay a high transfer fee to the selling club. In the wage negotiation, neither party has an advantage so 
buying club should be able to get NPV greater than or equal to lower limit depending on the transfer fee paid to the selling club. 
Formally: 
NPV?@ = (IR − known costs) − T − S?@ ≥ Lower limit?@ 
NPVH@ = T − (DR − costs) ≫ Lower limitH@ 
 
3. The buying club can extract rent from the player but it has to pay a high transfer fee to the selling club. Perfect scenario for the 
selling club, they can get high transfer fee without risking a break down in the transfer. Formally: 
NPV?@ = (IR − known costs) − T − S?@ ≥ Lower limit?@ 
NPVH@ = T − (DR − costs) ≫ Lower limitH@ 
 
4. Since neither of the clubs have bargaining power in the transfer fee negotiation, the negotiated transfer fee should satisfy both 
parties. The player has bargaining power in the wage negotiation so the buying club’s NPV will be greater than or equal to its lower 
limit depending on how much salary the player demands. Formally: 
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 NPV?@ = (IR − known costs) − T − S?@ ≥ Lower limit?@ 
NPVH@ = T − (DR − costs) > Lower limitH@ 
 
5. In this scenario none of the parties have bargaining or market power. The transfer should therefore make everyone better off. 
Formally: 
NPV?@ = (IR − known costs) − T − S?@ > Lower limit?@ 
NPVH@ = T − (DR − costs) > Lower limitH@ 
 
6. Since neither of the clubs have bargaining nor market power in the transfer fee negotiation, the negotiated transfer fee should 
satisfy both parties. The buying club has bargaining power in the wage negotiation so the buying club’s NPV will be greater than its 
lower limit depending on how high rent the buying club extracts from the player. Formally: 
NPV?@ = (IR − known costs) − T − S?@ > Lower limit?@ 
NPVH@ = T − (DR − costs) > Lower limitH@ 
 
7. Buying club will have to pay high salary to the player but it can pay a relatively low transfer fee to the selling club. Perfect scenario 
for the player which can take a big piece of the “pie”. NPV of buying club depends on how high salary the player demands. Formally: 
NPV?@ = (IR − known costs) − T − S?@ ≥ Lower limit?@ 
NPVH@ = T − (DR − costs) = Lower limitH@ 
 
8. Buying club can pay low transfer fee to the selling club. Neither player nor buying club have bargaining or market power in the 
wage negotiation so they should reach a solution both are happy with. Formally: 
NPV?@ = (IR − known costs) − T − S?@ > Lower limit?@ 
NPVH@ = T − (DR − costs) = Lower limitH@ 
 
9. The buying club can exploit both player and selling club. Perfect scenario for the buying club. They can get a big piece of the “pie”. 
Formally: 
NPV?@ = (IR − known costs) − T − S?@ ≫ Lower limit?@ 
NPVH@ = T − (DR − costs) = Lower limitH@ 
Figure 9 The parties’ bargaining power decides who gains from the transfer 
With this framework in hand we have a powerful tool for determining the transfer fee and 
wage. It can also be used to identify which parties will gain the most from the transfer. The 
challenge is to identify the factors or scenarios that determine the bargaining or market 
powers (bargaining powers from here on) so we can fully utilise the framework. So far we 
have mainly described those factors or scenarios in general, saying that the characteristics of 
the market, clubs and player determine the bargaining outcome. Now, we will look into what 
these characteristics actually are – we have already mentioned one: the player wants to leave. 
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 5.3 Factors determining bargaining power 
We start our search for the bargaining power-factors with an example of two factors that does 
not affect bargaining power: “the player is important for the club’s performance so we need a 
high price” or “the player faces strict labour market regulations so we are not willing to pay 
that much” (For EU/EEA (EU from now on) clubs this factor applies to the case of signing 
non-EU players. We will not consider the opposite because EU players rarely transfer to non-
EU clubs. As we mentioned in the introduction (under the headline ‘The Bosman ruling’) 
players from outside EU often face stricter regulations). Arguments like those will not affect 
bargaining power because they are already accounted for in ‘The valuation model’ through 
the player’s revenue contribution in the current and buying club, respectively. Therefore, 
minimum transfer fee will contain these effects. In fact, we have already covered many 
factors that one might think affect bargaining power. Other examples include: “player has 
remarkable popularity among the consumers”, included in ‘fan appeal’; “player has low 
fluctuations in performance”, included in player’s variance rate (b2) in individual performance 
(N); “player makes the other players better”, included in higher drift rate (γ) in team 
performance (S) through externalities; “player is approaching the end of his contract”, 
included in the value function, ∂V/∂t. If there are no substitute players, however, that is 
another case: it is not accounted for thus far and will clearly affect bargaining power: It is 
difficult to replace the player for the selling club, and the buying club will have difficulties to 
find other, similar players.  
By identifying factors affecting bargaining power – we will certainly not be able to identify 
all – we can extend the insight from the ‘Valuation factors framework’ and ‘The valuation 
model’ into a complete pricing framework for football players. We will group the factors 
affecting bargaining power into four groups: 1) Player specific factors, e.g. the player wants to 
move; 2) Selling club specific factors, e.g. financial difficulties; 3) Buying club specific 
factors, e.g. the club has win at all cost-owners; and, finally, 4) Competing bidder specific 
factors, e.g. there are many clubs wanting the player. The three first groups will explain all 
scenarios where there are only one buying club while inclusion of the fourth group lets us 
analyse all scenarios where there are more buyers. Hence, we will have to create two 
matrices; and these matrices will enable us to determine transfer fee and wage through Figure 
9. 
Without further ado, here are our factors determining bargaining power. 
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 5.3.1 Player specific factors 
The player specific factors contain characteristics about the player and his current situation. 
As we shall see, these factors can affect the bargaining power of the player as well as the 
selling and buying club. 
5.3.1.1 Does the player want to leave his current club? 
What the player wants – to stay or leave – is a big determinant when deciding bargaining 
power. Even though a player has to respect his contract, he still has a big influence over his 
club. There are numerous examples of players going public about their wish to move. 
Sometimes a player wants to move because he does not think he is playing enough matches; 
sometimes the player wants to move because he wants to be at a better, bigger or personally 
preferred team. The latter was the case with Cristiano Ronaldo, the current world record 
holder in transfer fee (as explained in the introduction). He said that “I’d like to play for Real 
Madrid but only if it’s true they are ready to pay what Manchester United ask of them. [...] 
However, it does not depend on me” (BBC, 2008a). In the end, despite Ronaldo’s claim, his 
move to Real Madrid probably depended a lot on him and what he said: Manchester United 
did not want to sell him – Ronaldo had four years left of his contract with them – and 
threatened to report Real Madrid to FIFA for ‘tapping up’ (see “The transfer from A to Z”) 
Ronaldo (BBC, 2008b). The case got so heated that even the FIFA president, Sepp Blatter, 
gave a statement: 
I’m always in favour of protecting the player and if the player wants to leave let him 
leave. If the player wants to play somewhere else, then a solution should be found 
because if he stays in a club where he does not feel comfortable to play then it’s not 
good for the player and for the club. I think in football there’s too much modern 
slavery in transferring players or buying players here and there, and putting them 
somewhere. We are trying now to intervene in such cases. (BBC, 2008c) 
Blatter’s statement clearly supports the players. Ceteris paribus, then, if the player wants to 
leave, the selling or current club loses bargaining power over the player: it would have to 
offer a better contract in order to induce the player to stay. If there is another club wanting the 
player (and the player wants to join that team), that club will also gain bargaining power over 
the selling club, as we have already mentioned. E.g. if the player is in his last year of contract, 
he can refuse to accept any new contract proposals from his current club and move for free at 
the end of his current contract. Waiting is then profitable for the buying club if the transfer fee 
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 required is higher than the value of the lost cash flows, or
signing the player right away. 
If the player has some years left of his contract the current club is probably best off by selling 
the player anyway, to avoid unsettling the player and/or the whole team, and to avoid bad 
publicity. All in all, if the player wants to move, the selling club loses bargaining power.
The opposite also holds: if a player does not want to leave, the current club will gain 
bargaining power over the player in wage negotiations and over potential bu
transfer fee negotiations, ceteris paribus. A player not wanting to leave can also sign a new 
long-term contract with his current club, e.g. five years, and hence increase his value to the 
current club through a higher decreased revenue (DR) 
horizon (Figure 10). This can make the transfer break down through a violation of the buying 
club’s NPV condition: The minimum transfer fee the buying club has to pay, i.e. the transfer 
fee that satisfies the selling club’s NPV condition after a new contract is signed, will be too 
high to satisfy the buying club’s NPV condition.
Figure 10 Player renews contract after 4.5 years
Figure 10 shows a scenario where a player renews his 5
it with Figure 6). The player’s value to the current club will then increase to a higher level 
(here it is assumed to be around 6) immediately after the player si
forces the clubs to recalculate their IR, DR and cost variables. Signing a new contract will 
therefore not affect the bargaining power ex post because ‘The valuation model’ will capture 
 opportunity cost, incurred by not 
 
or V(t) because of extended investment 
 
 
-year contract after 4.5 years (compare 
gns the new contract. This 
 
ying clubs in 
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 the changes. Ex ante, however, the selling club can increase their bargaining power through a 
threat of offering the player a new contract. 
Other players again are more or less indifferent to where they are playing. Bargaining power 
will then be explained better with other factors. 
5.3.1.2 Are there substitute players? 
Probable answers to this question are ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘some’. Later we will see that this factor, 
together with “Competing bidder specific factors”, determine the market structure in which 
the transfer takes place. If there are no substitutes, we are often talking about a superstar. Not 
surprisingly, a player like this will have bargaining power over potential buyers, ceteris 
paribus, in the wage negotiation, no matter how many buyers there are; and the current club 
will have bargaining power over the (competing) buying club(s), ceteris paribus. Again, we 
can use the example of Cristiano Ronaldo: Manchester United managed to get a world record 
breaking transfer fee of €94m and Ronaldo signed a very lucrative contract, currently making 
him the second highest earner in football (Eurosport, 2011). 
If there are many substitute players, each selling club and player lose bargaining power, 
ceteris paribus, no matter how many buyers there are. When there are ‘some’ substitute 
players we need to know how many buyers there are to determine the bargaining power. 
5.3.1.3 Income tax, currency, culture, climate and language 
International transfers where players move to a club in a different country is quite normal in 
football today (Kesenne, 2007), but the differences between different countries have not been 
a focus in the literature. In international transfers factors such as exchange rates, income tax, 
climate, language and culture play a part in determining the player’s wage. After Britain 
increased the income tax rate in April 2010 – “From April 2010 a new rate of Income Tax of 
50 per cent will apply to income over £150,000” (Directgov, 2010) – several big names in 
football expressed their concern. “Arsene Wenger, the Arsenal manager, predicted back in 
April that ’the domination of the [English] Premier League will go’ because of the 
government’s tax policy [...]” (White, 2009). This view, that football players are drawn to 
countries with favourable tax regulations, is also supported in the academic world (Kleven, 
Landais and Saez, 2010). We can therefore state that a club in a country with an advantageous 
income tax rate, compared to competing buying clubs, will gain bargaining power over the 
player in the wage negotiation, if the player currently plays in a country with relatively higher 
income taxation. 
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 The difference in currency can be a deciding factor because a footballer’s career is relatively 
short, and most of the players can only dream of earning the same amount of money after 
their playing career, so they have to save money to maintain their standard of living after their 
football careers. Receiving your salary in another currency than your home currency, then, 
(e.g. Spanish player in England moving back to Spain after his career in England) can give 
you a currency loss if the euro is appreciating. A club with a relatively stronger or 
appreciating currency will then gain bargaining power in the wage negotiation. 
Culture, climate and language can play a big role in deciding a player’s well-being. Hence, 
these factors matter when a player is facing a possible transfer. Ceteris paribus, a buying club 
with “worse” culture, climate and language than the player’s current club will then lose 
bargaining power in the wage negotiation, because they have to compensate the player for 
moving to the club. These factors can also help explain movement patterns: The concentration 
of Brazilian players in Europe is highest in Portugal, and the concentration of Argentinean 
players in Europe is highest in Spain and Italy (Eurorivals, 2011). 
5.3.1.4 Determining the bargaining power 
We have now explained the main player specific factors determining bargaining power. Again 
we point out that there are probably many more factors as well, but the ones we have 
presented here should give useful insight. Additional factors can easily be added anyway. In 
order to find out which parties have bargaining power, as we mentioned over, we need to put 
the factors in a matrix because they affect each other. So, before we explain the other three 
groups of specific factors we will illustrate the insight gained thus far – again by using the 
case of Cristiano Ronaldo – by putting the player specific factors in a matrix (Figure 11).  
In the figure, we are looking at the situation from Real Madrid’s point of view. It is read row 
by row, taking one factor combination at a time. A blue cell indicates that the combination of 
the two factors gives Real Madrid bargaining power; an orange cell means that the 
combination of the cells creates an ambiguous or neutral outcome; and a red cell indicates that 
the combination of the two factors gives Manchester United or Cristiano Ronaldo bargaining 
power. The relevant combination is marked with an “X”. For each combination of factors 
there is a row for selling club (SC), Manchester United, and a row for the player (P), Cristian 
Ronaldo. 
The first factor is “Player wants to move”. In this case, the answer is “Yes”. Then we move on 
to see how this affects the bargaining power of SC and P, respectively, in combination with  
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Yes Indif. No Yes Maybe No Higher Same Lower Better Same Worse Better Same Worse
Brgn pwr over SC X X X X
Brgn pwr over P X X X X
Brgn pwr over SC
Brgn pwr over P
Brgn pwr over SC
Brgn pwr over P
Brgn pwr over SC
Brgn pwr over P
Brgn pwr over SC
Brgn pwr over P
Brgn pwr over SC X X X
Brgn pwr over P X X X
Brgn pwr over SC X X
Brgn pwr over P X X
Brgn pwr over SC
Brgn pwr over P
Brgn pwr over SC
Brgn pwr over P
Brgn pwr over SC
Brgn pwr over P
Brgn pwr over SC
Brgn pwr over P
Brgn pwr over SC X
Brgn pwr over P X
Player specific factors
Yes
Indifferent
No
Player 
wants to 
move
Evaluating bargaining power 
from Real Madrid's point of 
view
Current tax for player Current culture, climate 
and language situation Current wage currencyPlayer wants to move Substitute players
Figure 11 Determining bargaining power in the Ronaldo transfer
Player 
specific 
factors
Better
Lower
Same
Substitute 
players
Current tax 
for player
Current 
culture, 
climate 
and 
language 
situation Worse
Same
Yes
Higher
No
Maybe
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 “Substitute players”. Here there are no substitute players, so the outcome is ambiguous for 
both SC and P: One factor is advantageous for Real Madrid and the other factor is 
advantageous for Manchester United and Cristiano Ronaldo.  
The British tax is higher than the Spanish tax (BBC, 2009b), but income taxation does not 
affect the bargaining power between the clubs. Hence, Real Madrid will gain bargaining 
power over Manchester United in this combination of player specific factors. Since Ronaldo 
both wants to leave and have higher current income taxation, he will lose bargaining power in 
the wage negotiation. We can use the same argumentation for the next two factors: They do 
not affect the clubs’ bargaining power over each other so the combination with “Player wants 
to leave” gives advantage to Real Madrid over Manchester United. For the Portuguese 
Ronaldo, culture, climate, language and wage currency will all be better in Spain (at least we 
think so!); giving Real Madrid bargaining power over the player. 
So far it looks like it is advantage Real Madrid. 
Next factor-row is “Substitute players”. The answer is “No” as we already know. Combining 
this with three factors not affecting the clubs all give the same answer: Manchester United 
will gain bargaining power over Real Madrid in the transfer fee negotiation. For Real Madrid 
vs. Ronaldo, all the combinations give ambiguous outcomes: “No substitutes” gives Ronaldo 
the advantage while the other factors give Real Madrid the advantage. However, we think that 
“no substitutes” weighs more than the other factors so the colour could be red instead. 
The bargaining powers are evening out: Real Madrid’s earlier advantage over both 
Manchester United and Ronaldo is disappearing. 
We have three combinations left and none of them affect the bargaining power between the 
clubs, so it does not seem like the player specific factors give a bargaining advantage to one 
club over the other. This is reflected in the transfer fee (even though it is very high): The 
transfer gave both clubs positive NPV (The Telegraph, 2010). Since we assume that Ronaldo 
prefer Spain over Britain because of lower tax, more familiar culture and language, better 
climate and preferred currency (euro preferred over pound sterling), we can conclude that 
Real Madrid will gain some bargaining power over Ronaldo for these three combinations of 
player specific factors. In total, then, it seems like Real Madrid has some (but not much) 
bargaining power over Ronaldo. By looking at Figure 9, our framework, we are in scenario 5 
or 6. These scenarios are consistent with Ronaldo’s transfer being profitable for Real Madrid 
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 and Manchester United, and they are also consistent with Ronaldo being the second highest 
earner in football: All three parties are better off by the transfer. The player specific factors, 
then, seem to describe most of the factors deciding bargaining power and, hence, the 
bargaining outcome in the transfer of Cristiano Ronaldo. 
Other transfers, as we will see, are more complex than the Ronaldo case and require a more 
thorough analysis including more factors. 
5.3.2 Selling club specific factors 
By extending the player specific factors with selling club specific factors we add some pieces 
to the puzzle that is the determination of bargaining power. These factors account for special 
characteristics of the selling club that are not included in our previous analysis. Again, we do 
not claim that we will find all the factors: these are selections of the factors we think are 
important. 
5.3.2.1 Does the club need to sell players for financial reasons? 
Many clubs are in financial difficulties with high salary expenses and high levels of debts 
(Drut and Raballand, 2010). In order to service their debt, wages and other obligations many 
clubs rely on player sales to stay solvent. Consequently, a selling club being in a difficult 
financial position can give the buying club an advantage in the transfer fee negotiations. 
Leeds United’s downfall, mentioned in the introduction, is a good example of this: In July, 
2001, Leeds signed Robbie Keane for €18m. In December the same year, another Robbie – 
Robbie Fowler – was acquired for €16.8m. About one year later both of them had been sold 
for €10.5m and €9.8m (Transfermarkt, 2011a; Transfermarkt, 2011b), respectively, in what 
can only be described as a fire sale. 
5.3.2.2 What is the selling club’s philosophy? 
This is an interesting topic that certainly deserves more attention than we are able to give it 
here. It concerns the owner’s strategy for how to maximise the object function. Some owners 
are willing to win at any cost while others prefer to operate in a more sustainable way. 
Company and ownership structure, corporate governance and corporate finance issues are 
central topics here. We allow ourselves an anecdote: Real Madrid, FC Barcelona and 
Manchester United are the three clubs with the highest revenues in the world, according to 
Deloitte (2011). While Manchester United is a private company, owned by the American 
Glazer family (Kelso, 2011), Real Madrid and FC Barcelona are owned by their vast member 
bases. These members choose the clubs’ presidents in democratic elections every four years. 
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 [Barcelona can] not raise finance through a stock-market flotation or a private capital 
injection. It can only raise money by tapping its fans. So club members between 2003 
and 2010 were almost doubled to over 170,000, via what it called The Big Challenge 
(El Grand Repte). [...] A major criticism of the mutual business model, for example in 
financial services, is that despite the oft-stated commitment to member democracy, 
there can actually be less accountability to members by the mutual board than in a 
traditional private company because membership is so dispersed. At Barcelona this has 
not been a problem thanks to the natural tendency of the fans to be emotionally 
engaged in the club. [...] Such member power and activism is not always the case. 
Over at mutually owned Real Madrid, a less engaged membership has seen successive 
club presidents rule in a semi-aristocratic style. These bosses spend heavily on players 
the club cannot really afford only to be bailed out by public authorities. Taxpayers, in 
other words. Ultimately, the best argument for mutual ownership is that football clubs 
are already de facto not-for-profit institutions [...]. But as Real Madrid illustrates, 
mutuality alone is not enough. What the Barcelona experience tells us is that the 
mutual model, when combined with top-class business practice, through a partnership 
with club supporters, can offer a sustainable alternative to the private ownership 
model. (Hamil, 2010) 
The presidential election campaigns in Real Madrid are often characterised by promises of 
buying certain star players. In fulfilling those promises, Real Madrid gave away a lot of 
bargaining power to the clubs that currently held the targeted players. This has resulted in 
Real Madrid holding the top four spots on the list of highest transfer fees in the world (BBC, 
2009a). 
You can argue that a win-at-any-cost philosophy will be reflected in a relatively low ‘lower 
limit’ (i.e. negative) in the NPV condition, while a more sustainable strategy will be reflected 
in a relatively higher ‘lower limit’. That is true: Owner philosophy is one of the factors 
determining the ‘lower limit’ and hence already accounted for. Until the UEFA Financial Fair 
Play rules become stricter (around 2018), different lower limits will be an important variable 
in the transfer market. But owner philosophy will also determine the inclination to reach the 
‘lower limit’, regardless of how low or high it is, and that is not accounted for yet. Win-at-
any-cost owners will, ceteris paribus, be more inclined to sign and/or sell players at the ‘lower 
limit’, clearly giving the other parties an advantage in the negotiations. 
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 5.3.2.3 Does the owner/club want to keep the player? 
This is another “Yes/No/Indifferent” question and, as the case is so often with football, it 
concerns feelings more than revenues. Have in mind: If the player is causing the club to lose 
money, i.e. his revenue contribution is less than his salary, this will already have been 
accounted for in the DR and ‘costs’ variables and, thus, this will not affect bargaining power. 
But there can also be other reasons why a club wants to sell a player, even if he is profitable: 
He can have fallen out with the club’s manager or coaches; he can be a victim of a new 
strategy for the club; or he can be too old, etc. The club can then offer the player to other 
clubs (cf. ‘The transfer process from A to Z’) for a low transfer fee, giving the other club 
bargaining power over both selling club and player. 
Some clubs also practice a policy of selling players that think they are “bigger than the club” 
in order to demonstrate that nothing or no one is, indeed, “bigger than the club”. Arguably the 
most famous football player in the world, David Beckham, experienced this when he was sold 
from Manchester United in the summer of 2003 (Palmer, 2003). He went to Real Madrid (no 
surprise there). 
5.3.3 Buying club specific factors 
Factors that are best explained as characteristics of the buying club will be explained here. 
However, from now on we will see that our analysis of bargaining power becomes 
increasingly more complex and that the borders between the groups sometimes are erased. 
Consequently, after we have presented this group we will merge and regroup the factors into a 
useable framework for determining bargaining power. 
5.3.3.1 Does the player want to move to the club? 
This factor can be seen as an interaction term with the “Does the player want to leave”-factor, 
and in our matrix we will combine them to one factor. It captures the player’s feelings 
towards the buying club. E.g. if the player wants to leave his current club because he wants to 
play more matches but he does not like our club, even though we can offer him more playing 
time and more money, the bargaining advantage over the player is wiped out. In fact, it is 
probably a deal breaker and the club should give up any further pursuit for the player. 
Remember our earlier quote: 
“The challenge for economic theory is to find a dynamic balance between love and 
money necessary to analytically grasp the passionate and pragmatic complexities of 
the beautiful game” (Vrooman, 2007a). 
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 An example where feelings were involved was the transfer of Spanish super star Fernando 
Torres from Atletico Madrid, a Spanish club, to the English club Liverpool FC. There were 
other, bigger clubs competing for his signature, such as Manchester United (Caroe, 2007), but 
Torres wanted to move to Liverpool: 
Reds [Liverpool FC] boss Rafael Benitez said the 23-year-old Spanish striker, who 
passed a medical on Tuesday, took a pay cut as part of the move. “The Liverpool offer 
arrived and I told the club to listen to that offer as that is the team I wanted to play 
for”, said the Spanish international. (BBC, 2007) 
So, if the current club is approached by the player’s favourite club, the buying club will gain 
bargaining power over both current club and the player. 
5.3.3.2 What is the buying club’s philosophy? 
This factor is also an interaction term. Together with the selling club’s philosophy these two 
factors decide which club is more inclined to reach their lower limit. For instance, if the 
owner of the buying club is more willing to win at any cost than the selling club’s owner, the 
selling club will gain an advantage in the transfer fee negotiation and the player will gain 
bargaining power in the wage negotiation. The clubs that sold players to Manchester City FC 
after the club was purchased by the Abu Dhabi United Group, in August 2008 (BBC, 2008d), 
experienced that. Since the takeover, Manchester City has tried to become one of the top clubs 
in Europe; and in that quest the owners have had net transfer spending of more than €389m 
(Transfermarkt, 2011c), truly giving new meaning to the expression “win at any cost”. Real 
Madrid, in comparison, had a net transfer cost of €281m in the same period (Transfermarkt, 
2011d). The owners of Manchester City has a very low ‘Lower limit’ – it is lower than what 
UEFA will allow in the future (cf. Financial Fair Play) so they will face challenges in the 
coming years (Wilson, 2011) – and their inclination to reach the lower limit is high. 
5.3.4 The bargaining power framework with one buyer 
By using the factors explained thus far we will be able to analyse all scenarios where there are 
one buyer facing one or, in the case of substitute players, multiple sellers. In a scenario with 
one seller, the transfer fee and the player’s wage will only depend on the player’s and clubs’ 
characteristics, much like the scenario analysed in Carmichael and Thomas (1993). In the real 
world, however, a transfer with only three parties – the selling and buying club and the player 
– is the exception rather than the rule, but it can happen in transfers with super stars: The 
Ronaldo and Beckham transfers are two examples. With Ronaldo we showed that Carmichael 
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 and Thomas (1993) were right: The characteristics of the three parties determined the 
bargaining outcome. When there are more sellers, i.e. substitute players exist, however, the 
bargaining powers can change completely – the buying club is more or less a monopsonist – 
and we have included that possibility in our framework with the “Substitute players”-factor. 
Figure 12 shows how a situation with one buyer can be analysed with a matrix. As you can 
see, we have extended the matrix used for analysing the transfer of Cristiano Ronaldo; the 
blue, orange and red cells have the same meaning as before. Dark gray cells indicate a 
situation where no transfer will occur. Arguably, we should have used a wider range of 
colours to differentiate between important combinations and less important combinations, but 
we have chosen to use four colours to keep it simple. Increasing the range of colours is not a 
problem anyway. 
We are not going to explain how each combination of bargaining factors affects bargaining 
power – hopefully the reader will be able to that alone – but we will give some general 
insight.  
The worst combination a buying club can face – except if the player does not like the BC and 
no transfer can take place – is a scenario where there are no substitute players, the player does 
not want to move, the selling club does not need to sell for financial reasons, the SC is less 
inclined to reach the lower limit in a negotiation, and they want to keep the player. This 
bargaining scenario will give red cells across the board and it translates into the first situation 
in Figure 9: The BC has to pay a high compensation to the SC in form of a high transfer fee, 
and the player need high compensation in order to accept a contract offer from the BC. It is 
evident that the transfer can break down in this scenario if the selling club and player are 
abusing their bargaining powers.  
The opposite scenario, on the other hand, translates into the last situation in Figure 9: When 
there are many substitute players wanting to move, that are unwanted by their current clubs 
which also happen to be in financial difficulties, the buying club can act as a monopsonist – 
all the cells are blue. None of these two, extreme situations are common, however. In general, 
where there are substitute players and only one buyer, the buying club should find a selling 
club with a combination of low valuation, i.e. the minimum transfer fee is low, using the 
‘Valuation factors’ framework and ‘The valuation model’, and low bargaining power using 
this framework. But, in order to capture the most common scenarios, i.e. there are substitute 
players and there are competing bidders, we need to include the last factor group. 
83
Yes Some No Higher Same Lower Better Same Worse Better Same Worse Yes No Higher Same Lower Yes Indiff. No
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
Player specific factors Selling and buying club specific factors
Not to BC
Yes, likes BC
Needs to sellCurrent tax for player Current culture, 
climate and language Current wage currencySubstitute players
SC's tendency to reach 
lower limit
SC wants to keep 
player
Player 
specific 
Substitute 
players
Yes
Higher
No
Player 
wants to 
move
Yes, anywhere
Scenario where there are no 
competing bidders for the player. 
Transfer fee and salary are 
determined through negotiation
Some
Indifferent
No
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
SC
P
factors
Better
Lower
SameCurrent tax for player
Current 
culture, 
climate 
and 
language
Worse
Same
Selling 
and 
buying 
club 
specific 
factors
SC's 
tendency 
to reach 
lower limit
Higher
Same
Lower
Needs to 
sell
Yes
No
Current 
wage 
currency
Better
Same
Worse
Figure 12 The bargaining power framework with one buyer84
 5.3.5 Competing bidder specific factors 
These factors come last but they are certainly not the least: By introducing the possibility of 
competing clubs and their characteristics, and thereby finishing our analytical tool for the 
determination of bargaining power, we will be able to account for almost every thinkable 
scenario in the transfer market.  
Table 13 show what kinds of market structures we can get in the transfer market.  
 One buying club Several buying clubs 
Substitute players One buyer and several 
sellers: Monopsony  
Many buyers and many 
sellers: Monopolistic 
competition  
Many buyers and some 
sellers: Oligopoly 
No substitute players One buyer and one seller: 
Bilateral monopoly 
Many buyers and one 
seller: Monopoly 
Table 13 Different kinds of market structures in the transfer market 
Do not interpret the market structures too literally, they are only meant as a help in 
differentiating different scenarios from each other; the transfer fee and salary still depends on 
other factors as well, and the final framework will take all of this into account. 
5.3.5.1 The monopoly – an introduction 
You are maybe tempted to say: “where there are several clubs wanting the same player, the 
transfer will go through with a combination of transfer fee and salary that gives the club with 
the second highest paying capacity (i.e. second highest capacity of T+SBC) a NPV equal to its 
lower limit.” But you would only be partly right. We start our argumentation with an 
example: 
We have a player targeted by three clubs from the same country. There are no substitute 
players, i.e., we have a monopoly-like scenario. Let us put up the NPV conditions and work 
with them: 
 =  − 
  −  −  ≥   
 =  − 
  −  −  ≥   
 =  − 
  −  −  ≥    
 =  −  − 
  ≥  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 Now we make up some numbers: 
Club IR/DR Known costs Lower limit 
Max T+S / 
Min T 
Club A €15m 1 -1 15 
Club B 12 1 -5 16 
Club C 10 1 -1 10 
Selling Club 7 3 (SSC=2) 0 4 
Table 14 Three competing bidders with differing NPV conditions 
As we can see, the three competing clubs have different values for the variables in the NPV 
condition (Table 14). We assume that they have equal known costs and that they will have 
equal investment horizon or contract length. The player’s remaining contract time in the 
current club is also of that length. Club A is the most winning and popular team in the 
country/league which is reflected in the high revenue the player is assumed to contribute over 
the contract period. The owners are willing to suffer a €1m loss on the transfer. Club B is not 
as popular or successful on the pitch as Club A, but it has recently been acquired by a rich 
owner willing to spend almost whatever it takes to make the club better. Club C is identical to 
Club B in popularity and playing success but its owners are less willing to incur losses. The 
minimum transfer fee, i.e., the transfer fee that satisfies the selling club’s NPV condition, is 
€4m. The player’s salary in the selling club is €2m and other costs are €1m. 
First we assume that the player is indifferent to where he is playing; so it is reasonable to 
assume that wage will be his decision variable. The minimum wage the competing clubs can 
offer over the contract period is then €2m since that is the value of his current contract. A 
lower offer will be rejected by the player and the transfer will break down. Before we get to 
the wage negotiation, however, the transfer fee has to be decided. Club A can maximally offer 
a T that is approaching €13m (T<13). Club C will not be able to match that offer so they are 
out of the game. Club B, however, can and will match the offer. In fact, Club B can offer 
€13m and force Club A to give up. Club B is then the winner of the first round and they can 
proceed to the wage negotiation alone. The player will be happy with a contract offer that is 
marginally better than his current contract, so the total cost for Club B is just above €15m, 
giving Club B a NPV= – €4m (€1m above its lower limit). In other words, the prediction we 
made above was correct: “where there are several clubs wanting the same player, the transfer 
will go through with a combination of transfer fee and salary that gives the club with the 
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 second highest paying capacity (i.e. second highest capacity of T+SBC) a NPV equal to its 
lower limit.” 
5.3.5.2 Wage levels vs. team harmony – new sides of the transfer market 
Now, let us introduce some more information about the player and clubs (Table 15), and make 
the scenario more realistic.  
Club IR/DR 
Known 
costs 
Lower 
limit 
Max T+S / 
Min T 
Salary for 
similar 
players 
Status of 
player in club 
Club A €15m 1 -1 15 3.5-4.5 Rotation 
Club B 12 1 -5 16 4.5-5.5 Rotation 
Club C 10 1 -1 10 2.5-3.5 First team 
Selling Club 7 3 (SSC=2) 0 4 - Best player 
Table 15 Three competing bidders with differing NPV conditions and characteristics 
The player is 21 years old with the potential of becoming a better player in the future. He will 
therefore have a ‘rotation’ status in Club A and B, i.e. he will play some matches but not all, 
until he improves his skills. For Club C he will already be good enough to play all the 
matches, hence, we assume that his development will be highest in this club. Further, the 
salaries for similar players are given by the intervals in Table 15 for Club A, B and C, 
respectively; so, to avoid envy and disharmony within the team, the clubs will offer a salary in 
that interval also to new and similar players. Before Cristiano Ronaldo transferred to Real 
Madrid, one of the Real Madrid players, Wesley Sneijder, expressed his concerns about 
potential wage differences: 
“It’d be bad for the dressing room because he would earn better wages than the rest of 
the squad,” the Dutch star [Wesley Sneijder] said. “It wouldn’t be a problem to me but 
some team-mates wouldn’t fancy it. Here we have players like him – Arjen Robben 
and Robinho for example. For sure I want to play with Cristiano but the dressing 
room’s harmony has to be maintained.” (The Republik of Mancunia, 2008) 
So, avoiding wage differences can be important to maintain harmony within the team. This is 
actually a side of the transfer market we have not yet considered, and it simplifies our 
bargaining model: The bargaining over wage will be limited to a team specific interval where 
the negotiation outcome depends on the parties bargaining power. Thus, we still have to use 
the bargaining factors framework to determine which party has the bargaining power in the 
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 wage negotiation, so what we have done up until now is not superfluous, but the negotiation 
outcome will not be that uncertain 
can incorporate those limits or wage interval into our NPV condition for the buying club:
 =  − 

It is time to supplement Figure 3 with our new knowledge. In Figure 13 we have illustrated 
the wage interval with two graphs: One with the lower limit wage and one with the upper 
limit wage. 
Increased revenue (IR), known costs (KC), transfer fee (T), and lower and upper limit salary 
are accounted for in the two graphs. The area to the right of the “Min T”
graphs and above the “Lower limit”
it in Figure 3.  
Let us return to our example and see how we can use Figure 13 to analyse the outcome. The 
player is still indifferent to where he is playing so wage is the decision variable. Again, Club 
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will have to offer €4.5m to match Club B’s contract offer, i.e., Club A’s relevant graph in 
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 cross. Club B will, of course, match the transfer fee offer and in the next round they will offer 
a marginally higher wage than €4.5m, making its total cost €15m. Again our prediction from 
earlier proved to be correct.  
By consulting Figure 9, we see that this scenario translates into a bargaining environment 
where the selling club has bargaining power over the clubs. For Club A, the player will also 
have bargaining power because Club A will have to match Club B’s wage offer which is on 
Club A’s upper limit: Hence, from Club A’s point of view, we are in area 1 in Figure 9. For 
Club B the situation is different: It has bargaining power over the player because it can offer a 
salary at the lower limit, so from Club B’s points of view we are in area 3 in Figure 9. 
Consequently, in the real world competing bidders will often have similar purchasing power, 
like Club A and B. Clubs with relatively low purchasing power, like Club C, will not target 
players where they will meet competition from clubs with relatively higher purchasing power, 
because they will not be able to follow in the bidding for transfer fee or wage.  
Before we see that market structure is not the only determinant of bargaining power when 
there are several buyers, we want to make some considerations regarding a potential financial 
constraint on the transfer fee. 
5.3.5.3 Incorporating a financial constraint on the transfer fee 
Football clubs, as all other companies, face potential limits on their investment costs due to 
financial constraints. Our pricing framework should therefore take that in to consideration. If 
we assume that the financial constraint only applies to the transfer fee and not the wage, the 
wage interval together with the analysis of bargaining power can help us include a potential 
financial constraint in the lower limit-variable: The parties know whether or not the player has 
bargaining power in the wage negotiation; therefore, they can say what the maximum 
expected salary is going to be before either of the negotiations start. If the player has a big 
advantage in the wage negotiation, the expected maximum salary will have to be set to the 
upper limit in the wage interval; but, if the player does not have that big of an advantage, the 
expected maximum salary can be set lower. That is, we can make the wage interval even 
narrower. Formally, we can rewrite lower limit like this: 
 
∗ = &'() − *+ − ,-. − /+ ,  0 
Subtracting known costs (KC), expected maximum salary (E(S)) and financial constraint (FC, 
i.e. what the club can maximally spend on a transfer fee) from the increased revenue (IR) 
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 gives the worst case scenario for the club; it cannot have a NPV lower than that. Both of the 
expressions in the max-function will be horizontal lines in Figure 13 but only the one with the 
highest value – the topmost line – will be binding. So, either the club is restricted through the 
desired lower limit or it is restricted by the lower limit given by the financial constraint. 
We are still going to assume complete information so the selling club will know the financial 
constraint. Hence, Figure 9 and the bargaining power frameworks can be used the same way 
as before. If the buying club faces a selling club with high bargaining power (area 1,2 or 3 in 
Figure 9), however, and the buying club faces a strict financial constraint giving it a high 
(positive) lower limit, the transfer is more likely to break down. 
5.3.5.4 Market structure isn’t everything – the return of the bargaining factors 
Thus far, it looks like the market structure (monopoly) is the main factor for determining the 
transfer fee and wage when there are competing buyers. But what if the player in the example 
only wants to join Club C? We have already explained a scenario like that: The transfer of 
Fernando Torres to Liverpool (BBC, 2007). When a player has his mind and heart set on 
joining one particular club, he will not accept any contract offers from other clubs. Therefore, 
they will not come with competing offers. The implication for our analysis of bargaining 
power is that a scenario like this can be treated like a scenario with only one buyer; i.e., use 
Figure 12. But we can think of other scenarios too. In our examples above we assumed that 
the player was only interested in money, hence Club B would win the bidding. But what if the 
player prefers to stay at a club that is performing better on the pitch, as opposed to just a high 
salary? Then Club A would have the advantage and Club B would probably have to pay a 
premium above the wage offer of Club A in order to sign the player. What happens if we 
introduce substitute players? And the selling club is in financial problems? It is evident that 
we have to return to Figure 12 and adapt it to a situation of homogenous competitors. 
5.3.6 The bargaining power framework with several buyers 
Figure 14 is our bargaining power framework with homogenously competing bidders, and it 
aims to account for market structure factors and other bargaining factors. The results obtained 
from the framework (“putting Xs in the correct cells”) will be individual; e.g. Clubs A and B 
will get different results. For Club A, the correct answer to the “Player wants to move”-factor 
is “Yes, prefer other” because the player maximises salary and will therefore, ceteris paribus, 
prefer Club B. As you can see from Figure 14 there are many red cells so the market structure 
(monopoly) is evident. The selling club has bargaining power in almost all combinations, save  
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 two: When there are more sellers than buyers, i.e., more substitute players than competing 
bidders, the competing clubs will have bargaining power because they can target different 
clubs; and when the club does not want the player, the competing clubs gain an advantage if 
the selling club is offering the player for its minimum transfer fee (cf. “Current player’s club 
approach other clubs because they want to get rid of a player” in “The transfer from A to Z”). 
5.4 Conclusive remarks on the bargaining model 
We started our study of the determination of transfer fee and wage by going through the 
literature on the field. Then we combined the insight from the literature – characteristics of 
the parties and the market structure determine the negotiation outcomes – with our own 
considerations and observations into a framework for deciding the two sizes (Figure 9). Next, 
we proceeded to identify the bargaining factors; that is, which characteristics of the parties – 
buying club(s), selling club(s) and player(s) – that determine bargaining and market power, 
and allowed the factors to affect each other (Figures 12 and 14). Further, we showed that 
wages have to be in a club specific interval to avoid disharmony within the players of the club 
and we incorporated that, together with a potential financial constraint on the transfer fee, into 
our NPV condition for the buying club.   
By identifying the appropriate scenario – one or several buyers, Figure 12 or 14, respectively 
– and go through all the factor combinations that determine bargaining power in that scenario, 
we will be able to find out which party or parties that have bargaining power and we can 
utilise Figure 9. With some scenarios this exercise will give us the exact transfer fee and 
wage; with other, more complex scenarios it will give us a fairly narrow interval for the 
transfer fee and wage. We will now try this exercise with Thierry Henry’s transfer from 
Arsenal FC to FC Barcelona. 
5.4.1 The transfer of Thierry Henry 
We start by looking at the known variables in the two clubs’ NPV conditions: IR, DR, known 
costs, lower limits and wage limits. 
Club IR / DR Known costs Lower limit Min S Max S 
Arsenal £17m  15.7(£110k p/w) 0 - - 
Barcelona 30 0 -5 14.4 (£85k p/w) 20.7 (£111k p/w) 
Table 16 Known variables. Sources: Own calculations; Harris, 2006; The Telegraph, 2008; FC Barcelona Blog: Barca 
Transfer Zone, 2009 
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 We assume that known costs in Arsenal, which they now save, only consisted of Henry’s 
remaining salary: £110,000 per week (Harris, 2006) or £15.7m capitalised with 4.5% over the 
next three years. This may be a wrong assumption but other costs will be so small compared 
to salary and potential errors in the calculation of DR that they will not affect our answers. 
The same argumentation goes for known costs, i.e., other costs than salary, in Barcelona too, 
so we set it equal to zero. Lower limit is zero in Arsenal; this is a reasonable assumption given 
their sustainable business model (Harris, 2011). Concerning Barcelona’s lower limit, they 
faced hard competition on the pitch from Real Madrid that year and were looking to improve 
their performance. The club had also tried to sign Henry for many years: “’Thierry Henry is a 
player we’ve been after for many years and now he’s here,’ said Laporta [President of FC 
Barcelona” (Baskett, 2007). We therefore estimate their lower limit to be £-5m, i.e. the 
capitalised loss connected with the transfer over the next four years (Henry’s contract length 
in Barcelona) can be £5m, and it is not affected by a financial constraint. Minimum and 
maximum salaries are the capitalised values of similar players’ – Deco and Ronaldinho, 
respectively – salaries over 4 years in Barcelona. 
We can now put up the NPV conditions and find the starting intervals. For Arsenal: 
 =  − 	
 −   ≥   
 =  − 1.3 ≥ 0   ≥ 1.3  !  = 1.3 
And Barcelona: 
" = 	# −  " −  − $" ≥  "  ℎ $"&'$, $) 
" = 30 −  − $" ≥ −5 ℎ $"&+14.4 , 20.7/  
Let us illustrate this with Figure 15: 
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 Now we need to use the bargaining model to 
in Barcelona. There were no competing bidders so we can use Figure 12 to analyse the 
bargaining powers. Our results from the bargaining power analysis can be seen in Figure 16. 
We emphasise that these are our
wrong. The most influential factors in the analysis of bargaining power are that Henry is a 
superstar with no substitutes; he is indifferent in the choice between Arsenal and Barcelona, 
but Arsenal does not want and does not have to sell him. These combinations give Arsenal a 
big advantage over Barcelona in the transfer fee negotiation and Henry an advantage in the 
wage negotiation. What speaks in favour of Barcelona is that Spain has better weather, 
currency – Henry is French so the euro is probably preferred 
foreigners (Goal, 2009d), but these factors only affect the bargaining power of the player. 
All in all, we can therefore conclude this analysis by saying that A
power over Barcelona, but neither party had any advantage in the wage negotiation. Hence, 
we are in area 2 of figure 9: “Buying club will have to pay a high transfer fee to the selling 
club. In the wage negotiation, neither party has 
get NPV greater than or equal to lower limit depending on the transfer fee paid to the selling 
club.” Since neither party have bargaining power in the wage negotiation, Arsenal will 
assume that Henry will deman
  
Figure 15 NPV graphs for FC Barcelona 
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 £17.6m. Arsenal will therefore demand a transfer fee equal to Barcelona’s purchasing power 
less expected salary for Henry: 
 = 30 − 
 − 17.6 ≥ −5  
 = 17.4 
In the wage negotiation, it is difficult to find an exact answer but we can give a narrower 
interval because we know the transfer fee and hence the new limit for the maximum wage: 
[14.4 , 17.4] 
Since neither party has a bargaining advantage we guess that they will agree on a wage that is 
in the middle of this interval, i.e., £15.9m. 
If we compare the results of our analysis with those of the real world, we are not that far off. 
The transfer fee was £17m and the capitalised value of wage (pre-tax) was £16.7m. It looks 
like our bargaining model managed to explain the transfer fee and wage quite well in this 
case. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have made an attempt to construct a complete pricing framework for football 
players based on theory  and real world. In answering the first research topic – What value 
can a football player add to a football club? – we discovered that different kinds of players 
will affect revenue in different fashions. To categorize different players, and to describe how 
they affect revenues, we established two valuation factors: ‘increased performance’ and ‘fan 
appeal’. In addition to describe how a player affects revenue, the valuation factors also 
describe a player’s performance and how the player can affect the whole team’s performance. 
Based on this, we were able to include the valuation factors in an option pricing framework. 
The option pricing framework utilizes the evaluated player’s performance, and a football 
club’s revenue and performance to calculate a player’s financial value. Hence, it fits the two 
valuation factors. Because no football clubs have exactly similar characteristics, different 
clubs will get different financial value for the same player – there is no market price for a 
football player. Thus, to answer the second research topic – How much will the club have to 
pay for that player? – we had to establish a bargaining framework. 
We found that characteristics about the clubs and the player together with the market structure 
(number of interested clubs vs. number of sellers), are the main determinants for deciding the 
96
 transfer fee and the player’s wage. We created two frameworks to capture important club and 
player characteristics (bargaining factors): One where there is one buyer and another where 
there are competing bidders. By assuming complete information in the transfer market, the 
participants in the transfer can analyse which party has bargaining and/or market power and, 
consequently, what the transfer fee and wage should be. 
 
  
97
 References 
Adler, Moshe (2006): “Stardom and Talent”. Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, 
Volume 1, ch. 25. 
 
Amir, Eli & Livne, Gilad (2005): “Accounting, Valuation and Duration of Football Player 
Contracts”. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32(3) & (4),  
 
Andreff, Wladimir & Szymanski, Stefan (2006): Handbook on the Economics of Sport. 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 
 
Antonioni, Peter & Cubbin, John (2000): “The Bosman Ruling and the emergence of a single 
market in soccer talent”. European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 9 (2), pp. 157-73 
 
Atkinson, Scott E., Stanley, Linda R. & Tschirhart, John (1988): “Revenue Sharing as an 
Incentive in an Agency Problem: An Example from the National Football League”. Rand 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 27-43 
 
Baimbridge, Mark, Cameron, Samuel & Dawson, Peter (1995): “Satellite broadcasting and 
match attendance: the case of rugby league”. Applied Economics Letters, 2, pp. 343-346 
 
Barajas, Angel, Fernández-Jardón, Carlos & Crolley, Liz (2005): “Does sports performance 
influence revenues and economic results in Spanish football?” MPRA Paper No. 3234 
 
Baskett, Simon (25.06.2007): “Henry completes move to Barca”, Reuters [internet] 
Accessible from: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/06/25/uk-soccer-spain-
idUKL253361120070625> [Downloaded 01.06.2011] 
 
Baz, Jamil & Chacko, George (2004): Financial Derivatives. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
BBC (04.07.2007): Liverpool complete Torres signing [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/europe/6239286.stm> [Downloaded 28.05.2011] 
 
BBC (06.06.2008a): Ronaldo ‘wants to play at Madrid’ [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/teams/m/man_utd/7439031.stm> [Downloaded 
23.05.2011] 
 
BBC (10.06.2008b): Real deny Man Utd Ronaldo claims [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/teams/m/man_utd/7416981.stm> [Downloaded 
23.05.2011] 
 
BBC (10.07.2008c): Ronaldo ‘wants transfer freedom’ [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/teams/m/man_utd/7499028.stm> [Downloaded 
23.05.2011] 
98
 BBC (01.09.2008d): Arab group agrees Man City deal [internet] Accessible from 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/teams/m/man_city/7591735.stm> [Downloaded 
28.05.2011] 
 
BBC (11.06.2009a): History of the world transfer record [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/8085391.stm> [Downloaded 28.05.2011] 
 
BBC (17.07.2009b): Tax rise ‘to hike footballers pay’ [internet] Accessible from 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8155677.stm> [Downloaded 26.05.2011] 
 
BBC (04.02.2010): Court lifts Chelsea transfer ban over Kakuta signing [internet] Accessible 
from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/teams/c/chelsea/8499169.stm> [Downloaded 
06.05.2011] 
 
BBC (31.03.2011): Liverpool sponsor wants club to buy Asian stars [internet] Accessible 
from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/teams/l/liverpool/9442542.stm> [Downloaded 
31.03.2011] 
 
Borland, Jeffery & MacDonald, Robert (2003): “Demand for Sport”. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, Vol. 19, no. 4 
 
Brandes, Leif, Franck, Egon & Nüesch, Stephan (2007): “Local Heroes and Superstars: An 
Empirical Analysis of Star Attraction in German Soccer”. Journal of Sports Economics 2008; 
9; 266  
 
Broder, Christina (08.10.2010): “Deloitte UK Finds 2010 Premier League Clubs Transfer 
Spending Is 22% Below 2009” [internet], Big4, Accessible from 
<http://www.big4.com/news/deloitte-uk-finds-2010-premier-league-clubs-transfer-spending-
is-22-below-2009-1608> [Downloaded 26.05.2011] 
 
Carmichael, Fiona & Thomas, Dennis (1993): “Bargaining in the transfer market: theory and 
evidence”. Applied Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 1467-76 
 
Carmichael, Fiona, Forrest, David & Simmons, Robert (1999): “The labour market in 
association football: Who gets transferred and for how much?”. Bulletin of Economic 
Research, Vol. 51 no. 2, pp. 125-149 
 
Caroe, Chalie and agencies (2007): “I wanted Torres for Man Utd”, The Telegraph, 
14.12.2007 [internet] Accessible from 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/2328504/Ferguson-I-wanted-Torres-for-Man-
Utd.html> [Downloaded 28.05.2011] 
 
 
99
 Cathcart, Brian (2004): “Special investigation: Crisis at Leeds United”, The Observer, 
07.03.2004 [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2004/mar/07/sport.features1> [Downloaded 17.05.2011] 
 
Conn, David (21.03.2007): “Hammers face a pounding over third-party player agreements”, 
The Guardian [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2007/mar/21/newsstory.sport> [Downloaded 
18.05.2011] 
 
Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC) (1995): “Judgment of 15 December 
1995, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL and Others v Jean-
Marc Bosman and Others”. Reports of Cases before the Court, Case C-415/93, p. 4921 
 
Deloitte (02.2008): Football Money League: Gate receipts [internet] Accessible from 
<http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedKingdom/Local%20Assets/Documents/UK_SBG_FML08.pdf> [Downloaded 
10.01.2011] 
 
Deloitte (02.2009): Football Money League: Lost in translation [internet] Accessible from 
<http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_GB/uk/industries/sportsbusinessgroup/a02ee3dad5181210
VgnVCM100000ba42f00aRCRD.htm> [Downloaded 10.01.2011] 
 
Deloitte (03.2010): Football Money League: Spanish Masters [internet] Accessible from 
<http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedKingdom/Local%20Assets/Documents/Industries/Sports%20Business%20Group/UK_
SBG_DFML2010.pdf> [Downloaded 10.01.2011] 
 
Deloitte (02.2011): Football Money League: The Untouchables [internet] Accessible from 
<http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedKingdom/Local%20Assets/Documents/Industries/Sports%20Business%20Group/UK_
SBG_DFML2011.pdf> [Downloaded 27.05.2011] 
 
Directgov (22.06.2010): “Income Tax and National Insurance rates for 2010-11” [internet] 
Accessible from: 
<http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Nl1/Newsroom/PreBudgetReport2009/DG_183037> 
[Downloaded 07.04.2011] 
 
Dixit, Avinash K. & Pindyck, Robert S. (1994): Investment under uncertainty. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press  
 
Dobson, Stephen & Gerrard, Bill (1999): “The Determination of Player Transfer Fees in 
English Professional Soccer”. Journal of Sport Management, Vol. 13, pp 259-79 
 
100
 Dobson, Stephen & Gerrard, Bill (2000): “Testing for monopoly rents in the market for 
playing talent. Evidence from English professional football” Journal of Economic Studies, 
Vol. 27 No. 3, pp 142-64 
 
Drut, Bastien & Raballand, Gäel (2010): “The Impact of Governance on European Football 
Leagues’ Competitiveness”. EconomiX, Working Paper 2010-27 
 
ESPN (21.08.2010): AC Milan announce Ibrahimovic deal [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://soccernet.espn.go.com/news/story?id=818790&sec=transfers&cc=5739> 
[Downloaded 16.05.2011] 
 
Eurorivals (2011): Football Players Abroad [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://eurorivals.net/abroad.html> [Downloaded 26.05.2011] 
 
Eurosport (22.03.2011): La Liga - Messi, Mourinho football’s top earners [internet] 
Accessible from: <http://uk.eurosport.yahoo.com/22032011/58/la-liga-messi-mourinho-
football-top-earners.html> [Downloaded 24.05.2011] 
 
FC Barcelona Blog: Barca Transfer Zone (29.04.2009): Deco plays it hard [internet] 
Accessible from: <http://fcbtransfers.blogspot.com/2009/04/2008-deco-plays-it-hard.html> 
[Downloaded 01.06.2011] 
 
Feess, Eberhard and Gerd Muehlheusser (2003): “The Impact of Transfer Fees on 
Professional Sports: An Analysis of the New Transfer System for European Football” 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 105, no. 1, pp 139-154 
 
FIFA (2010): FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players [internet] Accessible 
from: 
<http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/01/27/64/30/regulationsstatu
sandtransfer2010_e.pdf> 
 
Fletcher, Paul (2005): “The truth about ‘tapping up’” BBC, 01.06.2005 [internet] Accessible 
from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/4599103.stm> [Downloaded 13.05.11] 
 
Fort, Rodney (2005): “The Golden Anniversary of ‘the Baseball Players’ Labor Market’” 
Journal of Sports Economics, Vol. 6, no. 4, pp 347-358 
 
Frick, Bernd (2007): “The football players’ labor market: empirical evidence from the majour 
European leagues” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol 54, no. 3, pp 422-446 
 
Garcia-del-Barro, Pedro & Pujol, Francesc (2007): “Hidden Monopsony Rents in Winner-
take-all Markets – Sport and Economic Contribution of Spanish Soccer Players” Managerial 
and Decision Economics, Vol. 28, pp 57-70 
 
101
 Garcia-del-Barro, Pedro & Szymanski, S. (2009): “Goal! Profit maximization versus win 
maximization in soccer” Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 34, no. 1, pp 45-68 
 
Gibson, Owen (2009): “Chelsea banned by FIFA from signing players till 2011 over Gaël 
Kakuta” The Guardian, 03.09.2009 [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/sep/03/chelsea-fifa-transfer-ban-gael-kakuta> 
[Downloaded 06.05.11] 
 
Goal (11.06.2009a): Real Madrid's Cristiano Ronaldo Bid Tops World Record Chart 
[internet] Accessible from: <http://www.goal.com/en/news/8/main/2009/06/11/1318584/real-
madrids-cristiano-ronaldo-bid-tops-world-record-chart> [Downloaded 17.05.2011] 
 
Goal (11.06.2009b): Michel Platini Slams Real Madrid's 'Excessive' Pursuit Of Cristiano 
Ronaldo [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://www.goal.com/en/news/9/england/2009/06/11/1319165/michel-platini-slams-real-
madrids-excessive-pursuit-of-cristiano-> [Downloaded 17.05.2011] 
 
Goal (11.06.2009c): No Player Is Worth €95 Million - Barcelona Vice-President [internet] 
Accessible from: <http://www.goal.com/en/news/12/spain/2009/06/11/1319395/no-player-is-
worth-95-million-barcelona-vice-president> [Downloaded 17.05.2011] 
 
Goal (23.12.2009d): Beckham Law Expiration Acquits Foreign Signings Of Tax Break 
[internet] Accessible from: 
<http://www.goal.com/en/news/12/spain/2009/12/23/1705794/beckham-law-expiration-
acquits-foreign-signings-of-tax-break> [Downloaded 01.06.2011] 
 
The Guardian (21.01.2011): Ian Holloway calls Aston Villa's bids for Charlie Adam 
'disgraceful' [internet] Accessible from: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2011/jan/21/ian-
holloway-aston-villa-charlie-adam> [Downloaded 21.01.2011] 
 
Hamil, Sean (2010): “Barcelona show Manchester United how fan power can reap benefits”, 
London Evening Standard, 09.04.2010 [internet] Accessible from 
<http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/markets/article-23822574-barcelona-show-manchester-
united-how-fan-power-can-reap-benefits.do> [Downloaded 27.05.2011] 
 
Harris, Chris (04.02.2011): “Wenger - Financial fair-play rules uncertain”, Arsenal.com 
[internet] Accessible from: <http://www.arsenal.com/news/news-archive/wenger-financial-
fair-play-rules-uncertain> [Downloaded 01.06.2011] 
 
Harris, Nick (20.05.2006): “Ballack and Henry cash in as wages hit new high”, The 
Independent [internet] Accessible from: <http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-
and-comment/ballack-and-henry-cash-in-as-wages-hit-new-high-478925.html> [Downloaded 
29.05.2011] 
 
102
 Hausman, Jerry A., & Leonard, Gregory K. (1997): “Superstars in the National Basketball 
Association: Economic Value and Policy”. Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 
586-624 
 
Hull, John C. (2009): Options, Futures, and other Derivatives (7th edition). Upper Saddle 
River: Prentice Hall  
 
Kahn, Lawrence M. (2000): “The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, no. 3, Summer 2000, pp 75-94 
 
Kelso, Paul (02.02.2011): “Manchester United owners, the Glazer family, move ownership of 
the club to a company in Delaware”, The Telegraph [internet] Accessible from 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/manchester-united/8299603/Manchester-
United-owners-the-Glazer-family-move-ownership-of-the-club-to-a-company-in-
Delaware.html> [Downloaded 27.05.2011] 
 
Kleven, Henrik, Landais, Camille & Saez, Emmanuel (2010): “Taxation and international 
migration of superstars: Evidence from the European football market” NBER working paper 
series, Working Paper 16545 
 
Kesenne, Stefan (2007): “The peculiar international economics of professional football in 
Europe” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 54, no. 3, pp 388-399 
 
Manzenreiter, Wolfram (2007): “The Business of Sports and the Manufacturing of Global 
Social Inequality”. Business of sports, Vol. 2, no. 6 
 
Mason, Daniel S. (1999): “What is the sports product and who buys it? The marketing of 
professional sports leagues”. European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 33 No. 3/4, pp. 402-418. 
 
McDonald, Mark A., Milne, George R., & Hong, JinBae (2002): “Motivational Factors for 
Evaluating Sport Spectator and Participant Markets”. Sport Marketing Quarterly, Vol. 11, no. 
2 
 
Mercopress (31.12.2009): Ronaldo the most profitable player in Real Madrid’s history 
[internet] Accessible from: <http://en.mercopress.com/2009/12/30/ronaldo-the-most-
profitable-player-in-real-madrids-history> [Downloaded 17.05.2011] 
 
PRLog (12.05.2010): Real Madrid has recovered Cristiano Ronaldo transfer fee [internet] 
Accessible from: <http://www.prlog.org/10675785-real-madrid-has-recovered-cristiano-
ronaldo-transfer-fee.html> [Downloaded 17.05.2011] 
 
Mullin, Charles J. & Dunn, Lucia F. (2002): “Using baseball card prices to measure star 
quality and monopsony”. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 620-632 
 
103
 Nash, John (1950): “The bargaining problem”. Econometrica, Vol. 18, pp. 155-62 
 
Nash, John (1953): “The two-person cooperative games”. Econometrica, Vol. 21, pp. 128-40 
 
Neftci, Salih N. (1996): An Introduction to the Matchematics of Financial Derivatives. 
Academic Press 
 
Ogden, Mark (11.06.2009): “Cristiano Ronaldo transfer: Real Madrid agree £80 million fee 
with Manchester United” The Telegraph [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/manchester-united/5505073/Cristiano-
Ronaldo-transfer-Real-Madrid-agree-80-million-fee-with-Manchester-United.html> 
[Downloaded 17.05.2011] 
 
Osselaer, Jerome (06.11.2008): “How the Malaja Case Case Changed the Football World” 
Football Partnerships [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://www.footballpartnerships.com/2008/11/how-the-malaja-case-changed-the-football-
world/> [Downloaded 12.04.11] 
 
Palmer, Bryn (18.06.2003): “The end of the affair”, BBC [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/teams/m/man_utd/2980708.stm> [Downloaded 
28.05.2011] 
 
Porter, Philip K. (1992): “The Role of the Fan in Professional Baseball” in Paul M. Sommers 
(ed.) Diamonds are Forever: The Business of Baseball, pp.63-75. Washington D.C.:The 
Brookings Institution 
 
Premier League (2011): A History of The Premier League. [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://www.premierleague.com/page/History> [Downloaded 07.04.2011] 
 
Rosen, Sherwin (1981): “The Economics of Superstars”. The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 71, No. 5, pp. 845-858 
 
Rottenberg, Simon (1956): “The baseball players’ labor market”. Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 64, no. 3, pp 242-58 
 
Rubinstein, Ariel (1982): “Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model”. Econometrica, Vol. 
50, no. 1 
 
Sangera, Mandeep (30.01.2007): “The anatomy of a transfer deal” BBC [internet] Accessible 
from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/6314369.stm> [Downloaded 11.05.2011] 
 
Scully, Gerald W. (2004): “Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player Earnings”. 
Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 25, No. 2, Sports Economics, pp.77-86 
 
104
 Simmons, Robert & Robinson, Terry (2009): “Gate Sharing and Talent Distribution in the 
English Football League”. Manchester Business School Working Paper No 570 
 
Sloane, Peter J. (1961): “The labour market in professional football” British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 181-99 
 
Speight, Alan &Thomas, Dennis (1997): “Arbitrator decision-making in the transfer market: 
an empirical analysis”. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 44 No. 2, pp. 198-215 
 
Szymanski, Stefan (1998): “Why is Manchester United So Successful?”. Business Strategy 
Review, Volume 9 Issue 4, pp 47-54  
 
Szymanski, Stefan and Ron Smith (1997): “The English football industry: Profit, performance 
and industrial structure”. International Review of Applied Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 135-53 
 
The Republik of Mancunia (16.07.2008): Ronaldo Bad News For Real’s Dressing Room 
Morale [internet] Accessible from <http://therepublikofmancunia.com/ronaldo-bad-news-for-
reals-dressing-room-morale/> [Downloaded 31.05.2011] 
 
The Telegraph (12.01.2010): Manchester United’s debt: six key questions [internet] 
Accessible from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/manchester-
united/6969460/Manchester-Uniteds-debt-six-key-questions.html> [Downloaded 26.05.2011] 
 
Transfermarkt (2011a): Robbie Fowler - Player changes, player transfers [internet] 
Accessible from <http://www.transfermarkt.de/en/robbie-fowler/transfers/spieler_3225.html> 
[Downloaded 26.05.2011] 
 
Transfermarkt (2011b): Robbie Keane - Player changes, player transfers [internet] Accessible 
from <http://www.transfermarkt.de/en/robbie-keane/transfers/spieler_3144.html> 
[Downloaded 26.05.2011] 
 
Transfermarkt (2011c): Manchester City - Player changes, player transfers [internet] 
Accessible from <http://www.transfermarkt.de/en/manchester-city/transfers/verein_281.html> 
[Downloaded 28.05.2011] 
 
Transfermarkt (2011d): Real Madrid - Player changes, player transfers [internet] Accessible 
from <http://www.transfermarkt.de/en/real-madrid/transfers/verein_418.html>  [Downloaded 
31.05.2011] 
 
Tunaru, Radu, Clark, Ephraim & Viney, Howard (2005): “An option pricing framework for 
valuation of football players”. Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 281-295 
 
Tunaru, Radu & Viney, Howard (2010): “Valuations of Soccer Players from Statistical 
Performance Data”. Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, Vol. 6, issue 2, Article 10 
105
 UEFA (2010a): “UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, Edition 2010” 
 
UEFA (2010b): “The European Club Footballing Landscape” 
 
Vrooman, John (2007a): “Economics of Sport. Editor’s Introduction” Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 54, no. 3, pp 309-313 
 
Vrooman, John (2007b): “Theory of the beautiful game: The unification of European 
football”. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 54, no. 3, pp 314-354 
 
Watts, Robert & Harris, Nick (31.05.2009): “Football stars plan to dodge 50p tax rate” The 
Times [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/article6395778.ece> [Downloaded 07.04.11] 
 
White, Duncan (20.06.2009): “Xabi Alonso warns that tax will drive top players away”. The 
Telegraph [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/liverpool/5578084/Xabi-Alonso-warns-
that-tax-will-drive-top-players-away.html> [Downloaded 07.04.11] 
 
Wilson, Jeremy (02.02.2011): “Chelsea and Manchester City confident they will meet Uefa 
financial fair-play rules” The Telegraph [internet] Accessible from: 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/competitions/premier-league/8297380/Chelsea-
and-Manchester-City-confident-they-will-meet-Uefa-financial-fair-play-rules.html> 
[Downloaded 29.05.2011] 
  
106
 Appendix 
Multivariate Ito’s Lemma 
To find the differential dX, where 
 = 
 
and  
 =  
 +  
 
 =    +  !" 
#$"% =  & 
we must apply the formula for a multivariate Ito’s Lemma. The general expression for a 
multivariate Ito’s Lemma with two (T and S) Ito processes is (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994; Neftci, 1996; Hull 2009): 
Suppose you have two differentials: 
'( = )( + *(( where i = 1, 2 and     (1) 
#$+,% = &. 
Suppose - = -$'+, ',, % is a function of time and the two Ito processes x1 and x2. Then Ito’s 
Lemma gives the differential dF as 
- = .-.  + / .-.'(( '( +
12 / / .,-.'(.'11( '('1      $2% 
We can substitute (1) for dxi and write (2) in expanded form: 
- = 2.-. + / )( .-.'( + 12( / *(,
.,-.'(, + 12 / &(1*(*1 .
,-.'(.'1(31( 4  + / *(
.-.'( ((      $3% 
We can do the following substitutions to apply this formula to our case: 
- =  = 
 
'+ = 
 and ', =  
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 )+ = 
, ), =  , *+ = 
, *, = ! . 
.. = 0, ..
 = 1.           .. = − 
, ,            .,.
, = 0,          .,., = 2
5 , 
.,.
. = − 1,          .,..
 = − 1, 
Inserted into (3): 
 = 60 + 7
 ∙ 1 +   ∙ 9− 
,:; + 12 9,
, ∙ 0 + !,, ∙ 2
5 :
+ 12 7&
! ∙ 9− 1,: + &
! ∙ 9− 1,:;<  + 
 ∙ 1  + ! ∙ 9− 
,: ". 
By using the fact => = , we get: 
 = [$ + !, −  − &!%] +  − !". 
 
The differential dY, where ? = . Here, N and X are uncorrelated and 
 = ) + *@ 
 = A + B, + !, − 2!& Ω   
where A =  + !, −  − &!   
Using (3) without the terms including the correlation (=0) and substituting 
- = ? =  
'+ =  and ', =  
)+ = ), ), = A, *+ = *, *, = B, + !, − 2!& 
.?. = 0, .?. = , .?. = , .,?., = 0, .,?., = 0, .,?.. = 1, .,?.. = 1 
we now get 
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 ? = C0 + $) ∙  + A ∙ % + 12 $*,, ∙ 0 + ,$, + !, − 2!&% ∙ 0%D  + * ∙ @+ B, + !, − 2!&∙ Ω.                                                                                          $4% 
Since  = ? the expression can be written as 
? = $) + A%? + *?@ + B, + !, − 2!& ?Ω. 
If N and X are correlated: 
#$@Ω% = E 
the terms in (3) including the correlation must be added in (4): 
? = C0 + $) ∙  + A ∙ % + 12 $*,, ∙ 0 + ,$, + !, − 2!&% ∙ 0%
+ 12 FE*B, + !, − 2!& ∙ 1 +  EB, + !, − 2!& * ∙ 1GD  + *∙ @ + B, + !, − 2!& ∙ Ω 
Applying   = ? gives the following expression: 
? = H) + A + E*B, + !, − 2!&I? + *?@ + B, + !, − 2!& ?Ω. 
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